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BANDED CONTRACTS, MEDIATING
INSTITUTIONS, AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: A  NATURALIST
ANALYSIS OF CONTRACTUAL
THEORIES OF THE FIRM
TIMOTHY L. FORT* AND JAMES J. NOONE**
There are a spate of books . . . that suggest that business is a “mystical experience [or] a “religious
happening.”  And their mantra is lifted directly from the lips of Yoda—”experience the force.”  No
matter how sincere and well intentioned some of these texts are—enough already, please!1
Size matters not.  Look at me.  Judge me by my size, do you?  Hm?  Mmmm.
And well you should not.  For my ally is the Force.
And a powerful ally it is.
Life creates it, makes it grow.
Its energy surrounds us and binds us.
Luminous beings are we . . . not this crude matter.
You must feel the Force around you.
Here, hidden between you . . . me . . . the tree . . . the rock . . . everywhere!
Yes, even between this land and that ship.2
I
INTRODUCTION
Basing a theory of moral business on a celluloid science fiction creation may
not foster its intellectual stature, but one could substitute quotes similar to
Yoda’s from Buddhism,3 Hinduism,4 many yogis,5 many native religions,6 and
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1. Al Gini, Soul as an Ethic, 7 BUS. ETHICS Q. 157 (1997) (reviewing ALLAN COX, REDEFINING
CORPORATE SOUL: LINKING PURPOSE AND PEOPLE (1996)).
2. Yoda, THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK (Lucasfilm-Twentieth Century Fox, 1980).
3. See II MIRCEA ELIADE, A HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS IDEAS 91-106 (Willard R. Trask trans.,
1982).
4. See id. at 44-46.
5. See generally MIRCEA ELIADE, YOGA: IMMORTALITY AND FREEDOM (Willard R. Trask
trans., 2d ed. 1969).
6. See VINE DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION 88-95 (1994); SCOTT
CUNNINGHAM, HAWAIIAN RELIGION AND MAGIC 57 (1994); PETER J. PARIS, THE SPIRITUALITY OF
AFRICAN PEOPLES: THE SEARCH FOR A COMMON MORAL DISCOURSE 28-33 (1995).
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the Christian tradition,7 to name just a few religious sources.8  Indeed the
connectedness of reality has philosophical support from Spinoza9 to
Whitehead,10 as well as in the writings of many feminists11 and philosophers of
science.12  The engagement with a connected, transcendent reality in these
theologies and philosophies is often a starting point for formulating ethical
duties.  With such a pedigree, “experience the force” deserves neither ridicule
nor neglect.  Yet, the metaphor “force” easily can be used in ways that provide
little enlightenment and, as Star Wars itself elaborates, can have both good and
dark sides.
This article does not seek to formulate a theory of “business ethics
according to Yoda” or of any particular theistic system.  It does, however,
relate business ethics to notions of transcendence found in nature and
anthropology.13  Like Yoda’s “force,” nature—human and non-human—has a
good and a dark side: It is ambiguous.
Of course, the issues at stake in formulating a corporate governance
framework are a good deal more serious than science fiction.  Nevertheless, the
insight into ambiguity is important.  Basing a metaphor on an ambiguous term
can be a trap that conceals problematic assumptions and undermines “good”
meaning of the metaphor.  In particular, therefore, this article addresses the
notion of contracts within corporate legal theory because contracts are used as
a model both by those who advocate minimalist, agency business duties and by
others who propound a broad business ethic.  The agency use of the term by
                                                          
7. See, e.g., MEISTER ECKHART: SELECTED WRITINGS (Oliver Davies trans., 1994).
8. This list of world religions is not meant to be exhaustive.  For a sustained treatment of the
notion of a connecting force that lies at the basis of all religious life, see EMILE DURKHEIM, THE
ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE (Karen E. Fields trans., 1995).
9. See PAUL TILLICH, THEOLOGIAN OF THE BOUNDARIES 165 (Mark Kline Taylor ed., 1991)
(noting Spinoza’s claim of the inability to escape the infinite).
10. See generally ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, PROCESS AND REALITY: AN ESSAY IN
COSMOLOGY (David Ray Griffin & Donald W. Sherburne eds., 1978).
11. See, e.g., ROSEMARY RADFORD RUETHER, GAIA & GOD: AN ECOFEMINIST THEOLOGY OF
EARTH HEALING (1992).
12. See, e.g., ERROL E. HARRIS, FORMAL, TRANSCENDENTAL, AND DIALECTICAL THINKING:
LOGIC AND REALITY (1987).  Many neo-Darwinians take another approach which also stresses
thoroughgoing connectedness, but in a very materialist, non-spiritual sense.  See, e.g., RICHARD
DAWKINS, THE BLIND WATCHMAKER (1986).
13. This article makes no claim to speak for the entirety of anthropology.  Like any discipline,
anthropology possesses a variety of perspectives and paradigms.  Rather, the goal of this article, in
part, is to present anthropology as a viable and rich resource for information on the study of humans
and as a source of information on the human condition, some of which is contrary to key premises held
by current contract theoreticians.
In the most general sense, as the study of humanity and culture, anthropology is perhaps best
positioned among the social sciences to examine the variety of the human experience.  More
specifically, anthropology has grappled, since its inception, with the relationship between individuals,
the environment, and culture.
What we present in this article is not by any means a cross section of current anthropological
thought.  It is rather a selection of significant research, readily applicable to the issues at hand and
drawn from different areas within anthropology.  Each selection has something important to contribute
to the current debate.  In addition, to facilitate informed debate and the exchange of ideas, we have
chosen well-known and readily available research.
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theorists such as Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel,14 F.A. Hayek,15 and
Oliver Williamson,16 is quite different from its use by social-contract business
ethicists such as Steven Salbu,17 Michael Keeley,18 and especially Thomas
Donaldson and Thomas W. Dunfee.19
The agency theory of contracting is ultimately unpersuasive because it fails
to consider adequately the cultural embeddedness of rationality and choice.
Agency contractarians concentrate on a one-sided, dark notion of human
nature and do not account adequately for the coercion necessary to sustain the
choice that supposedly validates their approach.  Similarly, social
contractarians provide virtually no account of human nature and also miss the
embeddedness problem.  By not fully linking contracts to a transcendent
reality, social contractarians provide no real reason to choose social contracting
over agency contracting.
To make this argument, the article first poses a question about the use of
metaphor in business ethics in Part II.  This question is important for two
reasons.  First, ethical constructs are essentially arguments of metaphors.20
Whether one follows “stakeholder,”21 “virtue ethics,”22 “rights,”23 “contracts,”24
“naturalism,”25 or another theory, one is selecting a metaphor to describe a
model for the way business ought to be conducted.
Second, it is precisely the question of metaphor that becomes problematic
for a contractual approach to the corporation.  In particular, nature and
evolution have been used selectively as justifications for agency
contractarianism.  A basic problem arises when corporate governance trades
upon a notion of methodological individualism that is at the heart of a nexus-
of-contracts approach to corporate governance.  Part III elaborates the
                                                          
14. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW (1991).
15. See F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT (1988).
16. See OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS (1975).
17. See Steven Salbu, Insider Trading and the Social Contract, 5 BUS. ETHICS Q. 313 (1995).
18. See MICHAEL KEELEY, A SOCIAL-CONTRACT THEORY OF ORGANIZATIONS (1988).
19. See Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Toward a Unified Conception of Business
Ethics: Integrative Social Contracts Theory, 19 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 252 (1994).
20. See JAMES M. GUSTAFSON, INTERSECTIONS: SCIENCE, THEOLOGY, AND ETHICS 144-45
(1996).
21. See, e.g., John Boatright, What’s So Special About Shareholders?, 4 BUS. ETHICS Q. 393 (1994);
William M. Evan & R. Edward Freeman, A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation: Kantian
Capitalism, in ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS 97 (Tom L. Beauchamp & Norman E. Bowie eds., 3d
ed. 1988); Kenneth E. Goodpaster, Business Ethics and Stakeholder Analysis, 1 BUS. ETHICS Q. 553
(1991).
22. See, e.g., ROBERT C. SOLOMON, ETHICS AND EXCELLENCE: COOPERATION AND INTEGRITY
IN BUSINESS 115-17 (1992); Janet McCracken & Bill Shaw, Virtue Ethics and Contractarianism:
Towards a Reconciliation, 5 BUS. ETHICS Q. 297 (1995); Jeffrey Nesteruk, Law and the Virtues:
Developing a Legal Theory for Business Ethics, 5 BUS. ETHICS Q. 361 (1995).
23. See, e.g., PATRICIA H. WERHANE, PERSONS, RIGHTS & CORPORATIONS (1985).
24. See KEELEY, supra note 18; Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 19; Salbu, supra note 17.
25. See, e.g., WILLIAM C. FREDERICK, VALUES, NATURE AND CULTURE IN THE AMERICAN
CORPORATION (1995).
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difficulties of this nexus-of-contracts approach when contemporary
anthropological assessments of human nature are applied.
Part IV addresses the social contractarian approach.  Combined with Part
II’s understanding of evolution and nature, a constructive model emerges that
takes the best features of social contracting and agency contracting and blends
them with a naturalist-based communitarianism.  Part V offers a model of
corporate moral theory in which legitimacy is based on the acknowledgment of
a transcendent natural reality that circumscribes economic activity.
In large part, this article seeks to “mess things up.”  Although notions of
choice and shareholder-wealth maximization can provide clear decisionmaking
criteria, such notions should not be reified if they insufficiently account for the
complex realities of decisionmaking.  This comment is particularly applicable to
agency contractarianism, wherein it is assumed that individuals seek to
maximize self-interest with only marginal attention to the meaning of self.26
A dialectical epistemology that follows the work of philosopher Errol
Harris27 underpins our view of nature. By this, we mean three things.  First, any
description of reality must consider the relationship of the parts and the whole
of the given organization.28  Any part of an entity, whether a biological body or
an organizational structure, is always defined in relation to its whole, and,
conversely, any whole is always defined in relation to its parts.29  A description
that “brackets” or compartmentalizes phenomena does violence to the reality
of the entity itself.30  Unfortunately, according to Harris, positivism in the form
of mathematics and most economics describes reality in compartmentalized,
unrelated units.  In particular, what is bracketed are the metaphysical
assumptions that provide meaning for the interaction of components of those
units.31  One way to see the application of this is as follows:
Take, for instance, the simple theorem, if P, then Q.  P and Q do not exist
independent of a context of historical connectedness.  The very P that leads to Q is
comprised of internal relations that make P itself comprehensible.  In a context of
pure logic, the very identity of P and Q, as well as the relationship of P to Q, may
bracket the outside world sufficiently and remain a complete analysis of a given
situation.  If P is a market sample, however, conducted by a corporation which leads
to Q, which is a marketing strategy that takes advantage of the existence of P, the
theorem is not complete.  P may lead to Q, but what does P mean?  What if P is a set
of empirical data indicating a strong demand for child pornography?  That may lead
to Q (providing such material); but, when stripped of what P means (done by
bracketing moral analysis of the connection of P to the reaction people have to P),
neither P nor Q alone fully explain whether P leads to Q.  Not only is the normative
question of whether we should allow child pornography to be sold left out, but there
is insufficient description of reality itself.  Business persons, including business
                                                          
26. See Garry Miller, Ethics and the New Game Theory, in ETHICS AND AGENCY THEORY: AN
INTRODUCTION 117-26 (Norman E. Bowie & R. Edward Freeman eds., 1992).
27. See ERROL HARRIS, FORMAL, TRANSCENDENTAL, AND DIALECTICAL THINKING: LOGIC
AND REALITY (1987).
28. See id. at 131-34, 250-57.
29. See id. at 132.
30. See id. at 57-58.
31. See id.
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students, make this mistake in advocating transactions that they assume to have no
relevant data other than quantifiable cost-benefit analysis.  The very P that leads to
Q, however, is comprised of internal relationships that make P itself
comprehensible.32
Similarly, Kantian analysis also fails to describe any given whole, not because it
brackets normative considerations, but because it assumes that an autonomous,
subjective ego can undertake universalizing conceptions of ethical rulemaking.33
Second, a dialectical description is inherently relational.  Because
relationships are never fixed, a dialectical theory will emphasize context more
than self-interest and duties.  An emphasis on relationships and context,
however, opens up a vacuum of uncertainty, which humans generally want to
fill.  Thus, the history of dialectical thought is frequently linked to strong
accompanying, teleological constructs.  This is true of Hegel’s notion of Geist of
human history, and the communist dialectics of Marx and Mao.34
We are not personally opposed to notions of an ultimate telos working itself
to some kind of eschatological fullness in human history.  We doubt human
ability to describe it sufficiently to develop specific, universal criteria for
determining moral action.  We do believe, however, that nature provides
sufficient evidence of human nature to allow and even to require normative
inclusions of natural phenomena, albeit in existential terms, and does so by
recognizing characteristics of human nature that constrain the choices we
realistically can make.
Third, the previous two points should indicate that our dialectical approach
will muddy the waters of corporate governance.  Part V of this article sketches
an alternative conception of corporate governance, but this sketch is
intentionally suggestive rather than exhaustive.  Part V blends scholarship from
contemporary business, whose approach tends to be top-down (that is, what
managers should do), with an anthropological literature looking bottom-up
(that is, what is human beings need).
In particular, what human beings need to make business behavior more
ethical is a more significant experience of moral empathy.  That empathy, we
believe, is rooted in relational experience, where individuals observe the
consequences of their actions.  They most markedly have such experiences in
small groups.  We will refer to certain instances of these small groups as
mediating institutions.  In contrast, contractual accounts tend to emphasize
arms-length transactions against the development of moral empathy,
particularly in large organizations where bureaucracy separates consequences
from actions.
                                                          
32. Timothy L. Fort, Corporate Constituency Statutes: A Dialectical Interpretation, 15 J.L. & COM.
257, 267 (1995).
33. For a critique of Kant outside of dialectical theory, see ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER
VIRTUE 43-45  (1984).
34. See KEELEY, supra note 18, at 72-75.
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II
EVOLUTION, NATURE, AND ECONOMICS IN BUSINESS
One difficulty with using the notion of agreements as an organizing
corporate metaphor is that it can mean so many different things.  A simple
contract is essentially a contract between autonomous strangers.35  A relational
contract is an agreement among members of a community.36  A social contract
is a commitment to an ideal.37  One’s view of human nature influences how one
characterizes the contracts negotiated by individuals, even if the agreement is a
social contract.  American legal history, in fact, provides an example of this
anthropological assessment.
A social contract, based upon the premise that human beings are self-
interested, deceptive, opportunistic strangers,38 will produce a different ideal
social contract than one founded upon a view of individuals as altruistic, noble,
and committed to the common good.  Some legal historians have argued that
the U.S. Constitution’s system of checks and balances was the result of the
realization that Americans as a group were the former rather than the latter,
based on the profiteering that occurred during the Revolutionary War.39  A
rosy view of human nature hardly requires countervailing balances.  However,
an opportunistic human nature requires a social contract governed, if not by a
strong Hobbesian sovereign, at least by a system that limits “evil” persons and
groups from acquiring the power to abuse individual rights.
Not only does human nature affect the construction of a social contract, but
the establishment of a social contract also gives rise to rules of ethical behavior
that shape the moral character of the individuals subject to it.  For example, a
social contract ideal that corporations should provide lifelong employment to
workers would have an impact on the nature of specific employment
agreements.  It may well foster virtues such as loyalty and trust among those
working for the corporation.
The next section argues that free-market theory, as exemplified by one of
its most sophisticated spokespersons, F.A. Hayek, misleadingly uses
evolutionary theory to justify the superiority of the free market over collectivist
structures.  Section B describes how methodological individualism, in
particular, misuses evolution, and Section C points out that this focus on
individual life, like dialectical theory, provides a vacuum of purposelessness.
                                                          
35. See Steven R. Salbu, The Decline of Contract as a Relationship Management Form, 47
RUTGERS L. REV. 1271, 1298 (1995).
36. See generally Ian R. MacNeil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under
Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854 (1978).
37. This ideal, for instance, could be one of autonomy, freedom, and basic human rights—the
commitments made in the U.S. Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.
38. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 16.  A more complete discussion of Williamson appears in Part
III.
39. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 16-17 (1990); GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-
1787, 114-15 (1969).
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Hayek fills this vacuum with a teleology of the market itself, an approach that
is not necessarily inappropriate in moral terms, but is not mandated by
evolution, as Hayek seems to think.  Section D then summarizes this misuse of
evolution in relation to a more accurate way of using such evolutionary
metaphors.  This leads to a discussion in Section E of the constructive model
that describes multi-level selection theory.
A. Evolution and Economics
F.A. Hayek often used evolutionary justifications in his free-market theory.
Hayek believed that the free market offers an advance over collectivist social
structures simply because it allows humanity to survive.40  Hayek, however, did
not ignore the importance of moral and legal structures in the free market.  He
proposed a view of morality as a kind of cultural evolution that allows
individuals to transform a collectivist sense of self-interest.
Disagreeing with Hobbes, Hayek argued that there was never a set of
individuals who engaged in a war of all against all.41  Instead, human beings
existed in small bands of hunters and gatherers whose instincts were collectivist
and whose survival depended heavily upon basic instincts of solidarity and
altruism toward members of a group.42  We have not shed these instincts, and
such instincts lead to a collectivist longing for economic solidarity,43 as
manifested in the theory of socialism.44  Thus, Hayek’s free-market morality,
which places limitations on these instincts for solidarity and altruism, is always
opposed by those forced to accept such limitations.45
A central question, however, is whether living in a hunter-gatherer band is
the “default state” of human society.46  In other words, is such an existence
                                                          
40. See HAYEK, supra note 15, at 70.
41. See id. at 12.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 17.
44. See id. at 19.
45. See id. at 13.
46. The band, like any other human social organization, is largely a cultural construct, and by no
means a “default state.”  It involves the interplay of individuals with different perspectives, wants, and
needs, and the structure is continuously maintained, as are traditions and the culture itself, through
socialization, reenforcement, and sanctions.
Additionally, “the band” is a term used to describe a type of social organization.  It describes,
broadly, how a group interacts, makes decisions, and perpetuates itself.  The term “band” does not
necessarily imply a particular economic or subsistence strategy, such as hunting and gathering.  The
vast majority of band societies known historically and prehistorically were mobile to some degree and
were hunters and gatherers.  It is also true that even in anthropological literature, the terms “band”
and “hunter gatherer” often are used interchangeably.  The distinction between the terms is an
important one, however, and must be kept in mind to differentiate between arguments about either
social organization or economic/subsistence strategies.
Researchers Richard B. Lee and Polly Wiessner provide excellent accounts of a particularly well-
studied group, the Kalahari San, or Bushmen.  See RICHARD B. LEE, THE DOBE JU/’HOANSI (1984);
RICHARD B. LEE, THE !KUNG SAN: MEN WOMEN AND WORK IN A FORAGING SOCIETY (1979); Polly
Wiessner, Risk, Reciprocity and Social Influences on !Kung San Economics, in POLITICS AND HISTORY
IN BAND SOCIETIES 61 (Eleanor Leacock and Richard B. Lee eds., 1982).  In these accounts, it is clear
that band organization does not depend upon, and is not predicated upon, “altruistic instinct.”  To the
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something to which human beings naturally fall back when not in a larger social
organization?47  In fact, anthropologists conclude that it is not.  Hunter-gatherer
bands are cultural constructs that serve the needs of both individuals and the
group, and they must be maintained constantly through socio-cultural sanctions
and reenforcement.48  As discussed more fully below, any human community
depends upon cultural constructs; there is no magic differentiation in Hayek’s
dichotomy of natural versus civilized.
Contemporary global business clearly does not replicate small bands.
Indeed, Hayek observed that we live and work in an environment in which we
serve people we do not know and obey rules we have never played a part in
making.  In fact, we rarely understand our relationship to others regarding what
we manufacture.49  In such a system, notions of cooperation and solidarity are
anachronistic and at odds with contemporary civilization.50
The value of this fact, according to Hayek, is that the adaptation to living in
large groups allows for an extended order (for example, a civilization) to
develop, and that development allows us to survive.51  The extended order
promotes self-interest better than individual experiences and understandings.
Innate morality, based on solidarity, altruism, and group decisions, makes sense
in small groups with similar habits and knowledge facing known problems, but
it does not make sense when attempting to adapt to unknown circumstances in
an extended order.52  In civilization, the important virtues form an evolved
morality—consisting of values such as savings, “several property” (which
essentially means contract protection), and honesty—that allow the group to
discover more material resources and to obtain and preserve more from those
resources.53  The logic of Hayek’s market morality emphasizes virtues largely
                                                          
contrary, both researchers note that in this “most sharing” of cultures, individual acts of selfishness are
continually attempted.  In addition, it is clear that notions such as “a good provider to the community”
and “a freeloader” are commonly applied to individuals according to the community norms and
standards.  Thus, these ethnographic examples—of which there are many more—clearly suggest that
the key to the success of the egalitarian band does not lie in a wholehearted deference to a natural
collectivist instinct, but rather with the successful cultural enforcement of collectivist rules.
47. Bands are in no way considered to be isolated, or even independent, groups.  Some researchers
have concluded that it is quite impossible for such small groups to survive independently for any
significant period of time.  See, e.g., H. Martin Wobst, Boundary Conditions for Palaeolithic Social
Systems: A Simulation Approach, 39 AM. ANTIQUITY 147 (1974).  In addition, a primary focus of the
research of bands has been the very fluid boundaries that they exhibit.  Bands characteristically
manifest numerous types of relationships, individual and corporate and of varying strengths and
obligations, with many other similar groups.  Wobst and other researchers—in particular, ROBERT
WHALLON, ELEMENTS OF CULTURAL CHANGE IN THE LOWER PALAEOLITHIC (1989)—extensively
detail the reasons for this.  Bands, for the purpose of this article, thus are not isolated, small groups
within which individuals spend their entire lives.  They are small groups within which a person
functions most frequently, and which act as the primary group outside of the nuclear family within
which a person is socialized.
48. See generally  LEE, supra note 46 (both references).
49. See HAYEK, supra note 15, at 14.
50. See id. at 20.
51. See id. at 70.
52. See id. at 19.
53. See id. at 70.
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abstracted from those of a community in which individuals witness the
consequences of their actions.
How do we juggle these two moralities?  Hayek argued that the idea that
human beings can consciously structure a fair society to juggle them is a fatal
conceit.54  Instead of reason, Hayek relied on the cultural adaptations of moral
behavior found in custom and tradition: “Just as instinct is older than custom
and tradition, so then are the latter older than reason: Custom and tradition
stand between instinct and reason—logically, psychologically, temporally.”55
Hayek’s position raises two concerns.  First, the implications of Hayek’s
argument are a critique of more than socialism, but of any liberal social
contractarian position favoring distributive justice.56  Thus, he challenges all
social contractarian notions of business ethics.
Second, and more fundamentally, Hayek’s view is on shaky anthropological
ground.  His statement that “custom and tradition stand between instinct and
reason”57 is contrary to standard anthropological understandings of human
beings.  As made clear by Robert Whallon,58 and as also addressed by William
Frederick’s technologizing values,59 custom and tradition (for example, cultural
behavior) are predicated upon, and impossible without, the human ability to
abstract, to think symbolically, and to reason.  The evolution of human cultural
behavior, as informed by both the studies of modern and past cultures and of
our primate cousins, indicates that cultural behavior and the ability to think
abstractly evolved mutually and gradually.  Without the ability to construct or
conceive of abstract notions such as “uncle,” as opposed to “this man, the
brother of my mother,” most mechanisms that keep groups of persons together
in band-sized groups could not work.  In short, one cannot make the clean
differentiations within human societies that Hayek attempted; any culture
requires consciously constructed social norms.
B. Evolution, Economics, and Methodological Individualism
In his deconstruction of the attempt to link evolution and economics,
Geoffrey Hodgson bluntly states that Hayek “does not seem to realize that
[economists’] work is not equivalent to Darwinian evolution or natural
selection in a fully specified sense.”60  There are several reasons that this
statement is true.  One reason is simply that social evolution is of a different
character than biological evolution; analogies between the two are fraught with
danger.
Hodgson points out another reason, noting that Hayek “slurs over the fact
                                                          
54. See HAYEK, supra note 15, at 66-88.
55. Id. at 23.
56. See id. at 74.
57. Id. at 23.
58. See WHALLON, supra note 47.
59. See FREDERICK, supra note 25, at 168-208.
60. GEOFFREY HODGSON, ECONOMICS & EVOLUTION: BRINGING LIFE BACK INTO ECONOMICS
152 (1996).
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that the typical story of the emergence of ‘spontaneous orders,’ as found in the
words of the Scottish School, is ontogenetic in character.  Thus, it is not strictly
analogous either to a Darwinian process of natural selection or even to
evolution of a Lamarckian kind.”61  If Hayek’s notion of evolution and natural
selection were Darwinian, it would be phylogenetic in character, that is, a
description of “the complete and ongoing evolution of a population, including
changes in its composition and gene pool.”62  Rather than the entire population,
the carrier of Hayek’s evolution is the individual.  Hayek therefore accepts
methodological individualism and implicitly adopts the teleology of the good of
the free market.  Jon Elster describes methodological individualism as
the doctrine that all social phenomena (their structure and their change) are in
principle explicable only in terms of individuals—their properties, goals, and
beliefs. . . .The individual, along with his or her assumed behavioral characteristics, is
taken as the elemental building block in the theory of the social or economic system.63
Methodological individualism is contrary to the anthropological assessment
of the character of individual actions.  It is a long-standing tenet of
anthropology that culture is an emergent property.64  That is, culture is greater
than the sum of its parts.  Anthropologists, who were instrumental in the
construction of the anthropological concept of “culture,” were very concerned
with the role of the individual within groups, the primacy of the individual, and
                                                          
61. Id. at 160.
62. Id. at 40.
63. See Jon Elster, Marxism, Functionalism, and Game Theory, 11 THEORY & SOC’Y 453, 453
(1982) (emphasis added).
64. Hayek not only defines the individual as the locus of evolutionary change, but also as the level
most relevant to any incisive study of society.  See generally HAYEK, supra note 15.  Durkheim and
Malinowski demonstrate that, at the very least, the individual is not always the most fruitful object of
study, particularly if the goal is to understand a society or culture rather than simply the actions of an
individual.  See generally Emile Durkheim, Rules for the Explanation of Social Facts, in HIGH POINTS
IN ANTHROPOLOGY (Paul Bohannan and Mark Glazer eds., 1973); Bronislaw Malinowski, The Group
and the Individual in Functional Analysis, in HIGH POINTS IN ANTHROPOLOGY 275 (Paul Bohannon
and Mark Glazer eds., 1973).  In fact, a broad perspective that considers a person to be, at least in part,
a social creature suggests that the study of an individual as an isolated subject can never be truly
explanatory or predictive because it relegates culture and society to black box status.
While more recent work has investigated the relationships between individuals and societies,
Durkheim and Malinowski were included in this article for two reasons. First, the two authors shaped
subsequent work:  both historically and chronologically, their work offers an excellent starting point
for the students of such relationships.  Second, and more important, both Durkheim and Malinowski
were concerned with very broad questions, which seldom have been framed as broadly since.  As a
result, these authors offer basic information and insight readily comprehensible, applicable, grounded
in the real world based on observations.  See id.
Hayek also argues that the individual is the locus of evolutionary change.  Within the discipline of
anthropology and particularly within the subfield of archaeology, however, a debate on the role of the
individual in cultural evolution has been in progress—in its most recent incarnation—for more than ten
years.  Very recently, however, research has added some new insights to the debate, particularly in the
realm of methodology for study.  See Christopher Boehm, Emergency Decisions, Cultural-Selection
Mechanics, and Group Selection, 37 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 763 (1996).  Boehm’s article and a
subsequent critical analysis by Polly Weissner effectively summarize the positions taken and the
evidence used by those on both sides of the current debate.  See Polly Wiessner, On Emergency
Decisions, Egalitarianism, and Group Selection, 39 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 356 (1998).  For
purposes of this article, the conclusion from this research is that it is dangerous to view biological
evolution and cultural evolution as the same.
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the explanatory power of a focus on the individual.  Perhaps best known is
Emile Durkheim, whose concept of culture is usually translated from French to
mean “collective mind” or “collective conscience.”65  His basic point, which
remains powerful, is that a culture is an emergent property of a group of
individuals.  It is not reducible to the individual, but is defined by the sum total
of all of the perspectives, feelings, and behaviors of those who participate in it:
“The determining cause of a social fact should be sought among the social facts
preceding it and not among the states of the individual consciousness.”66
The work of Durkheim is complemented by the work of another well-
known anthropologist, Bronislaw Malinowski.67  Malinowski makes an equally
strong case for the inappropriateness of attempting to explain cultural or group
behavior solely by examining individuals.  Malinowski focused on the concept
of institutions in society.  Malinowski defined a institutions as “definite groups
of men united by a charter, following rules of conduct, operating together a
shaped portion of the environment, and working for the satisfaction of definite
needs.”68  This definition, and Malinowski’s approach to the individual and
culture, places institutions squarely between individuals and their needs, and
between the greater society and its needs—in short, as mediators.
Despite being contrary to anthropological analyses of human society,
methodological individualism has had an enormous impact on economic
thought, and on corporate governance, in which individual choice is
preeminent.69  Allegedly coined by Joseph Schumpeter,70 “methodological”
individualism focuses on the individual as the relevant datum of economic
analysis.  Thus, individuals and the contracts they make for their own self-
interest are the governing economic exchange.  Collections of individuals, such
as the corporation, are a nexus of methodologically individualistic contracts.
Hodgson argues, however, that methodological individualists have provided no
reason why social phenomena are individual rather than social: “It is simply
arbitrary to stop at one particular stage in the explanation and say ‘it is all
reducible to individuals’ just as much as to say it is ‘all social and
institutional.’”71
Hayek’s evolutionary descriptions of the market selectively employ a
metaphor in which adaptation occurs on an individual level.  But this
ontogenetic approach is neither consistent with the Darwinian theory on the
                                                          
65. See Durkheim, supra note 64, at 233.
66. Id. at 244 (emphasis omitted).
67. See Malinowski, supra note 64.
68. Id. at 291.
69. Of course, methodological individualism is compelling, insofar as it points to a specific set of
criteria and direction for decisionmaking.  If one knows that one should make decisions according to
profitability, then a great deal of work is eliminated in assessing other options.  Such a single-minded
focus is effective for many kinds of decisionmaking issues, ranging from one-issue politics to “winning
isn’t everything—it’s the only thing” in sports to ethnic cleansing.  Single-minded clarity may be
powerful, but it is not morally compelling.
70. See HODGSON, supra note 60, at 148.
71. Id. at 155.
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legitimacy of which Hayek trades, nor is it consistent with the spontaneous
orders championed by Scottish philosophers upon whom Hayek relies for the
transference of naturalist theory to free-market economics.  Moreover, by
ignoring standard anthropological theory, Hayek builds an economic system on
the soil of an only partially described view of human nature.
C. Teleology and the Free Market
While some theologians and other supporters of the anthropic principle wed
teleology to evolutionary processes, 72 evolutionary accounts typically do not.
Hayek, however, argues that the suppression of human nature’s instincts is a
necessary action for the rise of civilization.73  But, as Hodgson argues, “[s]urely
instincts of self-interest, competition, rivalry and even aggression are part of
our biological inheritance, along with other dispositions towards caring and
cooperation.  Hayek dogmatically assumes that we inherit one type of instinct
but not the other.”74  This dogmatism is based on an ideology that evaluates
political and social institutions in terms of those that maximize individual
liberty within a minimalist government.75
The flaw in the kind of classic liberal utopia proposed by Hayek and Spencer is both
to conceive of a perfectible type of system based on a ubiquitous kind of economic
arrangement and to limit the indigenous diversity to that of agency rather than
structure. . . .  Rather than a faith in evolution towards perfection, Hayek believes
that socioeconomic intervention must be pushed down a particular track precisely by
the creation of institutions and “general rules” which are necessary for the formation
and sustenance of the liberal utopia.76
Hodgson argues that the emphasis on nonintervention and the goodness of
free markets is obscured because free markets are the dominant norm in
today’s economy.77  However, developing economies in the former communist
block, the twin impulses of competition and cooperation run headlong into
each other.78  Free-market theorists favor a particular kind of government
conducive to a particular free-market economy.  Thus, use of the metaphor
“evolution” and implicitly grounding the authority of the free market in natural
processes demonstrates commitment to a teleological belief that free markets
produce a desired state of affairs.  But does nature inevitably lead to markets in
which individuals freely trade and evolve?  Under Hayek’s own theory, they do
not; their instincts first must be suppressed.  What is apparent in Hayek’s
notions of nature and evolution is the selective, idealized aspects of nature, and
the use of the rhetoric of evolutionary and natural descriptions of the world to
justify free markets.  Yet, nature and evolution are more complex than Hayek
                                                          
72. See, e.g., ERROL E. HARRIS, COSMOS AND THEOS: ETHICAL & THEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS
OF THE ANTHROPIC COSMOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE (1992).
73. See HAYEK, supra note 15.
74. HODGSON, supra note 60, at 162.
75. See id. at 181.
76. Id. at 182-83.
77. See id. at 183-84.
78. See id.
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concedes, and that complexity has implications for the kinds of contracts
individuals and groups make.
D. Metaphors of Evolution
Terms such as “evolution” have an aura of authority to them.  Yet, if
described incompletely, they carry that authority illegitimately.  This is
precisely what happens when theorists describe economic and business
competition as self-interest and survival of the fittest.  In fact, although a part
of common knowledge, the very term “survival of the fittest” is a misnomer
which incorrectly summarizes a basic concept of Darwinian evolution.  More
accurately, natural selection acts to prevent the survival of the unfit and, by so
doing, fosters the survival of the fit.  Anthropologist Kent Flannery argues that
the uniqueness of humanity is that it has undergone “two fundamentally
different types of evolution.”79  Biological evolution proceeds from an
adaptation from a previous phylogeny.  Thus, “[m]ammals arose from reptiles,
which arose from amphibians, which arose from bony fishes.”80  Social
evolution, conversely, generates human societies in multiple ways.  In Egypt
and Mexico, “rank” societies evolved from autonomous villages, but in
different ways and for different reasons.81  When a change to a more complex
state of social organization (for example, bands to chiefdoms) fails, humans
may return to the more basic band.  When such a failure confronts a mammal,
however, it does not return to being a reptile, but becomes extinct.82  The more
basic band is not a default social institution requiring no social maintenance,
but human beings can adapt to living in the prior form of society if a more
recent social structure has failed.
Flannery argues that societies are more akin to organs.  Eyes, for instance,
have evolved independently in various kinds of animals.83  Different species’
eyes did not all evolve from a common ancestor’s eyes; instead, each species’
eyes evolved independently from various seeing mechanisms to survive and
adapt.84  Thus, notions of evolution are useful, but the analogies must be to
comparable structures.  In particular, a view of economics and corporate
governance that assumes methodological individualism does not account for
the communal values and character of human nature.  Thus, the difficulty one
finds in Hayek’s analysis is that he uses a powerful rhetoric of evolution to
justify a socioeconomic system by only selectively focusing on certain aspects of
nature.  While we agree that nature and natural processes can be used in the
formulation of socioeconomic considerations, they should be used with more
care and complexity.
                                                          
79. Kent Flannery, Prehistoric Social Evolution, in RESEARCH FRONTIERS IN ANTHROPOLOGY 3
(Carol R. Ember & Melvin Ember eds., 1995).
80. Id. at 20.
81. See id. at 19.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 21.
84. See id.
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E. Multilevel Selection Theory
To make the evolutionary metaphor work, we would suggest that it be
employed through multilevel selection theory.  Part V provides a sketch for
how one might do this but, for our present purposes, we wish to make a narrow,
but important, methodological point in concluding our critique of our use of
nature for business.  Specific consequences of this methodology, such as
understanding cooperative as well as competitive aspects of human nature, will
be utilized specifically in critiquing contractarian theories.  Evolutionary
adaptation and natural selection take place on multiple levels.  That is, adaptive
selection may occur in different ways on differing levels:
[T]he possibility of multiple and higher levels of selection is now accepted by a
number of modern biological theorists, including the possibility of selection of species
and even ecosystems.  There is no apparent reason why multiple levels of selection
should not also exist within the socioeconomic world as well.  Hayek sees selection as
operating on a plurality of different groups or agencies, but seemingly always within a
given [market] structure.  Thus he ignores the possibility that selection may also be
working at the level of structure and substructure, creating a diversity not simply of
groups and agencies, but also types of economic system or subsystem as well as a
variety of market forms.85
The acceptance of multiple levels of evolution goes to the heart of
contemporary analyses of business ethics.  Methodological individualism is not
a complete assessment of human nature.  Hayekian free markets are not
dictated by nature, nor are they inconsistent with nature.  To analyze business
behavior in terms of Darwinian competitive markets introduces an ideological
teleology which depends on a moral justification based upon an appeal to
nature that simply is inaccurate.  A multilevel selection process, however,
incorporates the complexity in nature and acknowledges that human nature
depends upon solidarity, cooperation, and altruism as much as it does cunning,
competitiveness, and struggle.
Multilevel selection theory is not new: Darwin himself recognized it.86  One
can study the adaptive behavior of groups as one does individuals, but this does
not mean that groups and individuals are the same things.  The important task
is to learn from comparisons without conflating their separate aspects.  For
example, individuals who practice altruism toward everyone are relatively less
fit than others in the group,87 but subgroups of altruists are more fit than
subgroups of non-altruists.88  The fitness of the whole group thus is enhanced by
repressing the non-altruistic behavior of individuals within the group.89
Interestingly, the terms biologists use for the suppression of individual genes,
which may have genetic adaptive advantages for the individual but which
produce relatively less-fit social organisms in the aggregate, are “outlaws,”
                                                          
85. HODGSON, supra note 60, at 175-76.
86. See David Sloan Wilson, Altruism and Organism: Disentangling the Themes of Multilevel
Selection Theory, 150 NATURALIST S122, S123 (Supp. 1997).
87. See id. at S122.
88. See id.
89. See id. at S124.
FORT_FMT4.DOC 03/09/00  11:56 AM
Page 163: Summer 1999] BANDED CONTRACTS 177
“sheriffs,” “police,” “parliaments,” and “rules of fairness.”90
Thus, within any particular group, individuals are prevented from
undertaking selfish behavior because it is in the self-interest of the individual to
behave altruistically.  Groups thus perform a socializing function on individuals
for the benefit of both the group and the individual.  The individual human
body exercises social control over individual genes, but social control is at least
partially necessary for both individual and group survival.91  One way this
phenomenon could occur is through the development of a “group mind.”92
At the extreme, groups might become so integrated and the contribution of any single
member might become so partial that the group could literally be said to have a mind
in a way that individuals do not, just as brains have a mind in a way that neurons do
not.93
Human socialization, however,  is not simply biology, but culture.  Culture
shapes individual fitness as well as the group’s collective fitness.  Culture is also
the product, in significant part, of individual choices.  Thus, it is a mistake to
think that human societies, whether clans, nation-states, or corporations,
operate according to deterministic, naturalistic, evolutionary processes
identical to that of cells and genes.  But the importance of a group’s fitness to
an individual’s own fitness is apparent in both cases.  Individual relationships
with the community can be identified, but their particular manifestation differs
at differing levels of adaptation.
The community, however, may require significant sacrifice from its
individual members.  Wilson argues that “[v]irtually all individual-level
adaptations evolve in the form of genes that benefit the collective at little or no
cost to themselves.  Yet, when individuals benefit their groups at little or no
cost to themselves, these traits are not classified as group-level adaptations.”94
This argument is a trap.  It overlooks the adaptive group advantages that
influence individual choice. For example, one study shows that buffalo herds
engage in a form of communal decisionmaking similar to that of honeybees
even though, unlike honeybees, the buffalo do not share nearly as tightly
related a kinship breeding.95  Once in the “same boat,” individuals are
benefited by acting in the interest of the “boat.”96  Nevertheless, there are times
when group altruism is not smart—for example, if the group surrendered itself
voluntarily to a pack of wolves.  In short, the analysis cannot be reduced to that
of either the group or the individual.  A more complex dialectic is at work:
Individual welfare and individual identity are tied to a social nature.
In terms of business, then, rejecting Hayek’s misuse of the market as the
                                                          
90. Id.
91. See id. at S126.
92. Id. at S128.  For a good overview of organizational theory literature on these matters,
including that of a group mind, see James P. Walsh, Managerial and Organizational Cognition: Notes
From a Trip Down Memory Lane, 6 ORG. SCI. 280 (1995).
93. Wilson, supra note 86, at S128.
94. Id. at S126.
95. See id. at S132.
96. See id.
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natural individual construct eliminates the ideological teleology coercively
requiring a nexus-of-contracts view of the corporation.  The corporation is
more complex than the description given by methodological individualism and
the nexus-of-contracts theory.  The corporation is also comprised of social
beings who value many things besides the bottom line.
This analysis leads to two important preliminary conclusions.  First,
behavior that benefits an individual often is related to that which benefits the
group, and behavior that benefits the group often benefits the individual.  In
fact, an individual always exists within some greater group context, a culture or
the environment generally.  One must relate the individual to her community
and, dialectically, the community to the individual.
Second, norms of behavior will have a different content depending upon the
nature of the “same boat” in which individuals find themselves.  The same rules
of behavior do not apply to individuals who live within the same group and
those who live among different groups.  Rules of behavior well-suited to one
level are not necessarily suitable to another.  For instance, a rule may require
that an individual tell the truth to others.  Within the context of a tightly knit
group, this rule may well lead to efficient, adaptive behavior.  Selling a used car
to one’s nephew requires honesty; otherwise, the community (in this case, the
family) will punish the dishonest uncle.  However, to require the same uncle to
be equally honest to a carjacker, or even a car dealer, applies the rule of
honesty in a context in which its meaning, as well as its adaptive benefits, are
quite different.97
With this as background, we can now see how contractual notions of the
firm are dangerous, because they do not fully account for the social nature of
human beings.  Thus, a notion of autonomous individuals negotiating a real or a
hypothetical contract is immediately trading on an assessment of human nature
that can be strongly challenged anthropologically.
Contract analogies fall prey to the dangers of the misuse of metaphor.
Agency contractarians, like Hayek, presuppose a methodological individualism
that is not justified by human nature.  Social contractarians fall into a similar
trap because their theory of contract also insufficiently considers nature and
culture.
                                                          
97. This conclusion too is borne out in anthropological literature.  In many discussions of trade
among aboriginal populations, it has been observed that strict rules of fairness and behavior are
enforced with great strength close to home, but that with social and geographic distance, the
enforcement of such rules diminishes.  See DOUGLAS L. OLIVER, A SOLOMON ISLAND SOCIETY:
KINSHIP AND LEADERSHIP AMONG THE SIUAI OF BOUGAINVILLE (1955); MARSHALL SAHLINS,
STONE AGE ECONOMICS (1972) (particularly ch. 5). Both authors discuss the importance of good
relations with those who are most important.  Sahlins offers a succinct summation of the situation:
[There is] a tendency for morality, like reciprocity, to be sectorally organized in primitive
societies.  The norms are characteristically relative and situational rather than absolute and
universal.  A given act, that is to say, is not so much in itself good or bad, it depends on who
the “Alter” is. The appropriation of another man’s goods or his woman, which is a sin
(“theft,” “adultery”) in the bosom of one’s community, may be not merely condoned but
positively rewarded with the admiration of one’s fellows—if it is perpetuated on an outsider.
Id. at 199.  See also infra note 190.
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III
THE CORPORATION AS A NEXUS OF CONTRACTS
In this part, we make two main arguments.  In Section A, we describe the
nexus-of-contracts theory of the firm, relate it to the assumptions Hayek uses
concerning the free market, note the narrow sense of responsibility suggested
by this approach, and assess the ways in which exemplars of this approach
utilize aspects of human nature.  Section B provides three critiques of agency
contractarianism: a lack of attention to social embeddedness, an incomplete
view of human nature, and the lack of attention directed at the level of coercion
necessary to sustain the freedom of the market.  Section C summarizes the
assessment of agency contractarianism.
A.  Microcontracts on the Corporate Level
The nexus-of-contracts theory is the predominant theory of today’s modern
corporation.  Simplifying a great deal of legal history, the contemporary theory
states that “[e]verything to do with the relation between firm and the suppliers
of labor (employees), goods and services (suppliers and contractors) is
contractual.”98  In step with free-market economic theory, autonomous
individuals are freely able to choose whether to form a company, to be an
employee, investor, or other constituent, and to accept the responsibilities
accompanying such roles.99  Indeed, the freedom of individuals to choose is one
of the justifications typically offered for the moral legitimacy of a contractual
approach.  In addition to the moral justifications, however, there are other
important questions to consider: With whom do people contract, what
responsibilities do corporations then bear, and when, if ever, does contract not
work.
1.  Justification of Contracts.  The ability of those associated with the
corporation to choose freely is a central justification for traditional contract
theory.  For example, in perhaps the leading contemporary articulation of the
theory, Fischel and Easterbrook argue that this freedom includes the power to
put things other than profits first:
If the New York Times is formed to publish a newspaper first and make a profit
second, no one should be allowed to object.  Those who came in at the beginning
consented, and those who came later bought stock the price of which reflected the
corporation’s tempered commitment to a profit objective. . . . If [another] firm
suddenly acquired a newspaper and declares that it is no longer interested in profit,
the equity investors have a legitimate complaint.  It is a complaint for breach of
contract, not for derogation from some ideal of corporate governance.100
Business ethics scholar John Boatright turns the common presumption that
corporations should maximize shareholder value on its head when he argues
                                                          
98. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 14, at 16.
99. See Ian Maitland, The Morality of the Corporation: An Empirical or Normative Disagreement? ,
4 BUS. ETHICS Q. 445 (1994).
100. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 14, at 36.
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that because the theory itself is indifferent to financial structures, the theory
then is also open to the consideration and protection of other constituents.101
This is exactly what happens, he argues, in employee and customer-owned
firms.102  At the root of each of these conceptions is the notion of choice.103
Beyond this notion of choice is a related justification for the nexus-of-
contracts theory: Agency contractarianism is more efficient and produces more
material goods and services.  This notion is commonplace, as verified by nearly
any examination of market activities.  Consistent with Hayek’s free-market
capitalism, efficient companies tend to be profitable.  Boatright acknowledges
this fact when he writes that “[a]lthough many structures are possible, some are
more efficient than others, and over time more efficient structures tend to
predominate through a Darwinian struggle for survival.”104  Because
corporations are adept at producing more material goods and services,
however, Fischel and Easterbrook argue that shareholder profitability also
benefits stakeholders other than the shareholders because “each party to a
transaction is better off.  A successful firm provides jobs for workers and goods
and services for consumers.”105  This assertion is true, they argue, even in
situations involving plant closings, because the benefits to “workers and
communities in the new locale . . . must be greater, or there would be no profit
in the move.”106  Their view, of course, assumes that the only reason a company
would, in fact, relocate is for economic reasons, and treats particular
constituents as having interests in the corporation that are freely exchangeable.
2. Limited Responsibility of the Corporation: Two Masters or Too Many
Masters.  Fischel and Easterbrook assert that the normal model of corporate
responsibility in agency contractarianism is maximizing shareholder welfare.
To do anything else, such as to consider the impact on nonshareholder
constituents, would be to serve too many masters: “[A] manager told to serve
two masters (a little for equity holders, a little for the community) has been
freed of both and is answerable to neither.”107  This argument, however, is
erroneous.  Corporate executives do serve multiple masters, including
shareholders, creditors, and a variety of political officials.108  Serving more than
one master is part of the job.  There may be a point, however, at which too
many masters results either in gridlock or in the enhancement of managerial
                                                          
101. See John R. Boatright, Business Ethics and the Theory of the Firm, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 217, 222-
23 (1996).
102. See id.
103. See John Hasnas, The Normative Theories of Business Ethics: A Guide for the Perplexed, 8
BUS. ETHICS Q. 19 (1998).  Hasnas points out that the stockholder approach of Fischel and
Easterbrook, the stakeholder approach of Boatright, and the social contract approach in Part IV all
rely upon a notion of consent to justify moral obligations.
104. Boatright, supra note 101, at 223.
105. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 14, at 38.
106. Id. at 38-39.
107. Id. at 38.
108. See Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23 (1991).
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power by an executive shrewd enough to play various constituencies against
one another.109  On the other hand, it is dangerous to undermine a successful
institutional organization by “do-gooding” treatment of other constituencies.110
Against what potential dangers must a contract theory protect?  For Fischel
and Easterbrook, the key problem is the possibility that managers can take
advantage of investors.111  Investors hold firm-specific assets in the corporation
in the form of shares of stock.  Boatright notes, however, that other
constituents also have firm-specific assets:
If the total rents or quasi-rents fail to cover the promised wages or leave too little for
shareholders, then the investment might be considered a failure by the shareholders—
even if the firm is highly profitable as measured by the rents and quasi-rents
generated by the firm.  In such a situation, the shareholders might prefer to liquidate
the firm rather than deliver on the promises of higher wages, and the shareholders
could not be held to these promises because of their limited liability. In short,
shareholders can close down an otherwise profitable firm that generates great wealth
for its employees and society at large merely because the profits are flowing to these
other groups instead of the shareholders themselves.112
Thus, Boatright argues that employees, like shareholders, are residual
claimants.113
What these two positions demonstrate, at least in part, is what Eric Orts
calls “shirking” and “sharking.”114  Shirking refers to the fears that employees
will not fulfill their obligations to those who employ them.115  Sharking refers to
the abuse of power by those who control the organization by taking actions that
benefit some individuals rather than the entire firm.116  Both Easterbrook and
Fischel’s position and Boatright’s position are concerned that some members of
the firm will take benefits from or abuse the rights of a group of stakeholders
who ought to be protected.  The only question is who ought to be protected:
shareholders or other constituencies?  Beyond this common concern, albeit on
behalf of different interests, is another commonality: Both assume the primacy
of autonomous choice.  Even Boatright’s more broadly concerned model seems
to include a rationally self-interested person who cannot rely on the goodness
of others.  But are human beings really that selfish?  The autonomous
individual required by the market must repress the very instincts of altruism
and solidarity that could counteract shirking and sharking.
                                                          
109. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder
Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45, 70-71 (1991).
110. See Stephen B. Presser, Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation: Limited Liability,
Democracy, and Economics, 87 NW. L. REV. 148 (1992) (critiquing Fischel and Easterbrook and
warning of the dangers of playing with foundational corporate building blocks such as limited liability).
111. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 14, at 1.
112. Boatright, supra note 101, at 233.
113. See id.
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3. To Contract or Not to Contract.  Oddly enough, some agency
contractarians are more willing to consider human nature in their normative
theory than are many philosophers, particularly social contractarians.  Oliver
Williamson, for example, discusses two fundamental aspects of human nature
that accompany the traditional view that human beings act in self-interested
ways.  First, Willliamson follows Herbert Simon’s seminal insight that human
beings have “bounded rationality,”117 which includes both computational limits
and limits in the ability to communicate through language.118  Second,
opportunism is “lack of candor or honesty in transactions, to include self-
interest seeking with guile.”119  Joined with these traits are the additional
problems of uncertainty and populations of small numbers that prevent a
market check on the actions of any self-interested individual.
From his analysis, Williamson concludes that firms are better constructed as
hierarchical organizations than as market transactions.
The firm becomes a sole source supplier to itself for those transactions that are shifted
out of the market and into the firm; relevant prices are known or, in any event, bids
are presumably solicited less frequently as a result.  Second, the firm substitutes a
single incomplete contract (an employment agreement) for many complete ones.
Such incomplete contracts purportedly economize on the cost of negotiating and
concluding separate contracts.120
Williamson’s theory is complex, but it is logically coherent, given presumptions
of methodological individualism and a fairly limited description of human
nature.  He considers how to place individuals into a context in which they are
the most efficient producers for an organization.  That context does not mean
consensus decisionmaking, nor does it depend upon notions of altruism,
solidarity, or the other instincts Hayek views as inappropriate in the free
market.
Williamson, however, does provide, implicitly or otherwise, a view of
multilevel selection.  That is, Willliamson understands that different organizing
principles may be better than others, depending on the level of analysis.
Among firms, or individuals acting as consumers, price generally serves as the
organizing principle for decisionmaking.  The same is not true within the firm:
While price system has advantages where remote parties to a transaction are not
apprised or need to be apprised of details of transactions, internal organization allows
parties to deal with uncertainties in part because “efficient codes are more apt to
evolve and be employed with confidence by the parties.  Such coding also economizes
on bounded rationality.”121
For Williamson, transactional contracts serve individuals best because they
encourage opportunistic representations and haggling, but a corporate system
is better served without such transaction costs.122  The three advantages of
                                                          
117. WILLIAMSON, supra note 16, at 9.
118. See id. at 21-22.
119. Id. at 9.
120. Id. at 4.
121. Id. at 25.
122. See id. at 27.
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internal, hierarchical organizations are that individuals “are less able to
appropriate subgroup gains” as a result of opportunism, such organizations can
be more effectively audited, and an organization can more effectively resolve
disputes.123  These rationales are hardly the stuff of ethical inspiration, but they
demonstrate Williamson’s understanding of the human need for cooperation
and satisfactory work environments.
Williamson argues that atmosphere makes a difference in a transaction.124
Similarly, as Hodgson quotes, “[p]eople just do not maximize on a selfish basis
every minute.  In fact, the system would not work if they did.  A consequence
of that hypothesis would be the end of organized society as we know it.”125
Arguing explicitly against the standard economic model, Williamson notes that
transactions are often not neutral and instrumental; individuals require a
satisfying exchange relation, so quasi-moral considerations are relevant.126
While there are quasi-moral associational benefits, increased profitability also
requires checks on shirkers.127  The importance of constructing a community,
however, does not alone legitimate a consensus form of decisionmaking.  A
peer group making decisions based on information flowing to all members, in a
sort of modern band fashion, would simply overload communications and
would preempt valuable time individuals could use for other purposes.128
Instead, Williamson argues, a simple hierarchy can provide the sense of
community individuals need, along with the sense of cooperation necessary for
a satisfying exchange experience, just as well as a peer group.129  Moreover, a
hierarchy can do so much more efficiently.130
An authoritative order is usually a more efficient way to settle minor conflicts (for
instance, differences of interpretation) than is haggling or litigation. . . .  In addition,
outside arbitration, as compared with inside conflict resolution, has a less easy (more
costly) access to the facts and tends to (1) employ restrictive rules of evidence, (2)
consider the issues narrowly, from the point of view of what is actionable rather than
in terms of what really is at stake, (3) cast the problem in the context of legal
precedent for the class of cases to which it is related rather than in firm-specific terms,
and (4) favor equity in relation to efficiency considerations where these goals are in
conflict.131
Thus, Williamson relies upon a conception of human nature that, while
apparently one-sidedly dark, is in fact logically extended to develop a corporate
governance system based on acquiescence to authority.  We shall point out the
moral weaknesses of this approach, but Williamson does offer a hierarchical
construct that at least pays close attention to the dynamics of human nature.
                                                          
123. Id. at 29.
124. See id. at 37.
125. HODGSON, supra note 60, at 4 (quoting Kenneth J. Arrow, Oral History I: An Interview, in
ARROW AND THE ASCENT OF MODERN ECONOMIC THEORY 233 (George R. Feiwel ed., 1987)).
126. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 16, at 38.
127. See id. at 44.
128. See id. at 46.
129. See id. at 54.
130. See id.
131. Id. at 101.
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4.  Contracts with Whom?  It is one thing to describe individual interactions
as sets of contracts, whether relational or transactional.  It is another to make a
contract with an abstract entity that is the product of individual interactions.  It
is at this point that contracts become individual contracts with phylogenetic
orders rather than ontogenetic ones.  A stock market sale could be described as
a transaction between two particular individuals.  But the sale decision is really
an interaction with a system, not a negotiation with an individual.  In short,
human beings contract with strangers, with community members, and with
abstract entities.
Contracts can be transactional between individuals or even between
corporations that bargain through their agents.  Contracts can be relational as
individuals or corporations negotiate over rights and duties within the context
of an ongoing relationship.  However, when individuals, even individual
corporations, contract with systems on terms where the individual or individual
corporation has only a marginal impact on the terms of the contract itself, then
notions of choice, consent, and freedom used to describe individual contracts
are no longer helpful.
B.  Three Critiques of Agency Contractarianism
If the nexus-of-contracts theory of the firm relies upon justifications of free
choice and human agency as normative rationales for its legitimacy, then an
understanding of such choice and agency is necessary.  In doing so, however,
one again runs into the difficulty of relying upon individual choice for
socioeconomic systems.  We do endorse, of course, the goodness of free choice,
but the reality of evolution is that organizational development is more than
methodological individualism.  If a model of methodological individualism is
applied on a phylogenetic rather than an ontogenetic level,132 what it means to
freely consent to an action can be distorted, particularly if the model uses only
a partial view of human nature.  The coercive nature of the system itself may be
obscured.
                                                          
132. See GEOFFREY M. HODGSON, ECONOMICS AND EVOLUTION: BRINGING LIFE BACK INTO
ECONOMICS (1996).  In an effort to clarify the relationship between economics and evolution,
Hodgson distinguishes between “ontogeny” and “phylogeny.”  “Ontogeny involves the development of
a particular organism from a set of given genes. . . .  [P]hylogeny is the complete and ongoing evolution
of a population including changes in its composition and that of the gene pool.”  Id. at 40.  In an
ontogenetic process, one can contemplate an organism reaching a final state, but a phylogenic process
is an open, ongoing system.  Free-market economists tend to think that self-interested individuals are
constant and therefore immune from a phylogenic feedback mechanism that may make them want to
consider something other than self-interest, such as the welfare of others in the group.  The difficulty
with methodological individualism is that it insists upon an ontogenetic human nature of stable, self-
interested preferences through which one can voice consent or refusal to consent while not taking into
account the phylogenic feedback loops that allow any notion of consent to make sense.  Moreover,
since the phylogenetic process is an open, evolving system, one cannot simply rest with an ontogenetic
characterization of the participants in that system.  An individual certainly can consent to participate
in a particular transaction, but the notion of consent is far more complex in the context of a system
such as a corporate governance system.
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1.  Social Embeddedness.  Mark Granovetter argues that both the model of
atomized individualism, resulting from the social contract theories of Rawls
and Hobbes, and the “embedded” model, traced to tribal societies in which
economic action is the determined result of social kinship patterns, are
problematic.133  The embedded description provides an oversocialized view of
human nature, while the atomized view provides an undersocialized view.134
Instead, persons have a dual nature: We both are constrained and informed by
our communitarian norms and retain an ability to transcend that community.
Granovetter, however, uses  this dual nature to reach a new insight: In both
over- and undersocialized views of human nature, an atomized actor decides
and carries out economic action.135  In Hobbes’s theory, for instance, the wholly
atomized residents of the state of nature surrender their rights to an
authoritarian power and obediently obey an oversocialized state.136  In the
oversocialized condition, social influence is an external force that is
internalized by the individual.137  Ongoing social relations existing outside of
the mind of oversocialized persons cease to be a factor in understanding what
the individual will do.138  In reality, human beings act neither as atoms outside
of a social context nor as automatons slavishly following a script written for
them by their community’s institutions.139
Granovetter’s analysis raises an important point for business ethics.
Individuals are not autonomous decisionmakers, nor are they simply the
product of their community.  More than authoritative institutions and
autonomous choices affect economic behavior.  Between an oversocialized and
undersocialized account of human action are concrete patterns of social
relations.  These patterns of relationships are often outside of any formal norm
or rule and, while concrete, can be very difficult to define.  For example, the
trust developed between a supplier and purchaser may lead to firm loyalty, and
the parties may bend the formal rules to accomplish their mutual objectives.
Such concreteness is a very real contract of significant importance within a
relationship and within communities.  They are too specific and concrete, and
too important to the participants, to be evaluated simply in terms of many
generalized norms.  Thus, Granovetter does not and cannot make “sweeping
(and thus unlikely) predictions of universal order or disorder but rather
assumes that the details of social structure will determine which is found.”140
That is, the variety and complexity of the internal contracts are too varied and
diverse to apply anything but the most basic universal rules.  Similarly, Steven
                                                          
133. See Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness,
91 AM. J. SOC. 481, 481-82 (1985).
134. See id. at 483-87.
135. See id. at 485.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 486.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 487.
140. Id. at 493.
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Salbu argues that international joint ventures have difficulties because
“[c]ontractual terms have no absolute meaning independent of the context in
which they are created; and socio-linguistic differences between contracting
parties create breeding grounds for contextual ambiguities.”141
Extant social contracts thus cannot be only formal institutional rules, nor
can ethics be left to autonomous decisionmakers.  Instead, moral reflection is a
mediating process within communities.  Rogene Buchholz and Sandra
Rosenthal aptly describe this process:
[T]he creativity of the individual can be contrasted with the conformity represented
by the common perspective, but not with community.  That which both founds and is
founded upon this activity of ongoing adjustment is a community, and in its historical
rootedness it develops its own particular organs for the control of the process.  The
ability to provide the means of mediating within the ongoing dynamics of adjustment
constitutes a community of any type as a community.
This adjustment is neither assimilation of perspectives, one to the other, nor the
fusion of perspectives into an indistinguishable oneness, but can best be understood as
an accommodation through accepted means of mediation.  Thus a community is
constituted by, and develops in terms of, the ongoing communicative adjustment
between the activity constitutive of the novel individual perspective and the common
or group perspective, and each of these two interacting poles constitutive of
community gains its meaning, significance, and enrichment through this process of
participatory accommodation or adjustment.142
The difficulty with agency contractarianism is that it assumes an individual
capable of free consent without attempting to demonstrate that such free
consent in fact exists.  From a sociological perspective, human beings develop
categories of thought, choice, and meaning within a social, not autonomous,
context.
2.  An Incomplete View of Human Nature.  Contemporary findings
concerning the natural moral dispositions of primates, and studies of
psychological development, prompt sociobiologists such as Frans de Waal to
optimistically conclude that science is beginning to “wrest morality from the
hands of philosophers.”143  Citing the work of Richard Alexander, Robert
Frank, James Q. Wilson, and Robert Wright, de Waal embraces a naturalist,
evolutionary account of morality.  Such a focus on nature is compelling insofar
as it helps to ground normative theory, but the work of sociobiology is
dangerous if it precludes philosophical or theological reflection, analysis, and
prioritization of natural dispositions.  If the naturalists are correct that human
beings develop their moral sense through small communities, however, can
such an approach be reconciled with the powerful analytical tools of social
contract theory?
                                                          
141. Steven R. Sabu, Parental Coordination and Conflict in International Joint Ventures: The Use of
Contract to Address Legal, Linguisitic, and Cultural Concerns,  43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1221, 1241
(1993) (internal footnote omitted).
142. Rogene A. Buchholz & Sandra R. Rosenthal, Toward a New Understanding of Moral
Pluralism, 6 BUS. ETHICS Q. 263, 268 (1996).
143. FRANS DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED: THE ORIGINS OF RIGHT AND WRONG IN HUMANS AND
OTHER ANIMALS 218 (1996).
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Using these ideas requires great care.  The difficulty with sociobiology, and
perhaps evolutionary psychology, arises when it is used with excessive
confidence in its explanatory power and comprehensiveness.  Just as
methodological individualism is too single-mindedly confident in its ability to
explain life, so too is sociobiology.  Antipodal to methodological individualism,
sociobiology lurches to determinism with similar confidence.  While making use
of biological facts in our critique, we describe both the benefits and the
difficulties of a human nature most at home in small groups.  Because we view
human cognitive abilities as evolutionary adaptive advantages, we believe that
one can incorporate human nature’s preference for small groups into a broader
cultural construction that emphasizes its positive features rather than its
negative ones.  We want to offer naturalistic assessments in a provocative,
rather than a definitive, form.
In his controversial book, The Moral Animal, Robert Wright argues that
human beings are adapted—at this stage of our evolutionary development—not
to live in our contemporary, urban and suburban environment, but in a band
organization.144  The disjunction between this evolution and our current lives,
he argues, results in a good deal of our contemporary psychopathology.145
Wright is not alone in noting this need for small communities.  In eschewing
sociobiology, James Q. Wilson argues that, while Darwinian evolutionary
theory suggests that altruism is an adaptive mechanism for survival,146  the
nurturing characteristics of human beings result from the development of our
moral sense within small communities.147  Wilson provides several examples
from experimental psychology and anthropology.  He concludes that children
in rural, economically simple communities with strong kinship ties are more
willing to help and comfort others not only within their own group, but outside
of the group as well.148  The study of these same children and the history of
tribal warfare, however, indicate that such small groups have little conception
of universal rights and duties and have less intense commitments to those who
                                                          
144. See ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND
EVERYDAY LIFE 38-39 (1994) (“We aren’t designed to stand on crowded subway platforms, or to live
in suburbs next door to people we never talk to, or to get hired or fired, or to watch the evening
news.”).
145. See id.
146. See JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE 23, 40-41 (1993).
147. See id. at 50.
148. See id. at 47-50.  This concept of “sameness” is frequently and obviously operationalized
among band-level groups.  There are various mechanisms through which small bands maintain links
with other bands, thus forming larger effective groups for dealing with various environmental and
social stresses.  See generally Joseph B. Birdsell, On Population Structure in Generalized Hunting and
Gathering Populations, 12 EVOLUTION 196 (1958); LEE, supra note 46 (both references); WHALLON,
supra note 47.  Key among these mechanisms is the “fictive kinship” practiced, for example, by the
Kalahari San.  In these groups, tradition severely limits the number of possible names for an
individual.  These names are the same from band to band, and a man who enters or visits a band—even
though he may not have any blood relatives among its members—is treated as a brother by any who
share his name.  Thus, similarities serve as the foundations for relationships between different groups.
See supra notes 46-47.
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are unlike them.149  Nevertheless, Wilson argues that to a stranger in need of
help, residents of “small towns are in fact and not just in legend more helpful
than those [living] in big cities.”150  Our innate socialness leads us to identify
with those around us, which not only leads to the development of a nurturing
character, but also encourages atrocities perpetrated in the name of loyalty to
our group.151
If small groups encourage nurturing, then fostering that role while reining
in their destructive aspects is an admirable goal.  Studies from anthropology
and psychology suggest that it is a human predisposition to work in small
groups.  Psychologist Robin Dunbar, for example, found:
a correlation between the dimensions of the neocortex—the part of the brain engaged
in conscious thought—and the size of different groupings of mammals. . . .  In humans,
Dunbar found, the size of the neocortex predicts [optimal populations of] groupings
of about 150 people.  This number happens to conform to the approximate number of
the clan within hunter-gatherer societies; the company unit within the military; and
the aggregate of employees within a business that can be managed without an
elaborate bureaucracy.  The figure of 150, Dunbar writes, represents the maximum
number of individuals with whom “we can have a genuinely social relationship, the
kind of relationship that goes with knowing who they are and how they relate to
us.”152
Many years ago, Jacob Bronowski noted that the communication skills of
our hunter-gatherer ancestors were almost entirely internal.153  Colin Turnbull
suggests that hunting societies are typically larger than one or two families but
remain small,154 and Julian Jaynes, drawing on archeological evidence from
Glynn Issac,155 estimates that the optimal number for such groups is
approximately thirty.156  Peace and good relations are more important in these
groups than is adjudicating rights and duties,157 and responsibility is more
communal than personal.158  Norms become so embedded in the lives of
individuals that the norms become constitutive of what it means to be a
member of that group.
                                                          
149. See WILSON, supra note 146, at 47.  Wilson also describes several experiments in which even a
seemingly trivial degree of likeness causes persons to react more sympathetically to another’s plight.
For instance, when a researcher planted a money order made out to charity in a “lost” wallet together
with a public opinion poll filled out by the owner of the wallet, the finder was more likely to send the
money order to the charity if the completed poll indicated that the owner had views similar to those of
the finder.  See id. at 49.
150. Id. at 49.
151. See id. at 140.
152. Gary Stix, Different Strokes, SCI. AM., Nov. 1996, at 36 (reviewing ROBIN DUNBAR,
GROOMING, GOSSIP AND THE EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE (1996)).  Our thanks to Bill Frederick for
bringing this article to our attention.
153. See JACOB BRONOWSKI, THE ASCENT OF MAN 45 (1973).
154. See COLIN TURNBULL, THE FOREST PEOPLE: A STUDY OF THE PYGMIES OF THE CONGO 37
(1962).
155. See Glynn L. Issac, Traces of Pleistocene Hunters: An East African Example, in MAN THE
HUNTER 253, 253-61 (Richard B. Lee & Irvin DeVore eds., 1968).
156. See JULIAN JAYNES, THE ORIGIN OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE BREAKDOWN OF THE
BICAMERAL MIND 129 (1976).
157. See TURNBULL, supra note 154, at 118.
158. See id. at 125.
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The socially derived identity was by its very nature dependent on society.  But in the
earlier age recognition never arose as a problem.  General recognition was built into
the socially derived identity by virtue of the very fact that it was based on social
categories that everyone took for granted.  Yet inwardly described, personal, original
identity doesn’t enjoy this recognition a priori.  It has to win it through exchange, and
the attempt can fail.  What has come about with the modern age is not the need for
recognition, but the conditions in which the attempt to be recognized can fail.159
Thus, in addition to a sociological component of human nature, there is a
biological component as well.  Human beings are a communal species and, to
the extent organizational structure forces them into large bureaucratic groups
and then justifies such systems according to an insufficient account of
autonomous identity, modern society literally forces us to live in a way in which
we will most effectively obtain identity.
3.  The Coercion Necessary for Freedom.  It is a standard rule of contracts
that agreements are not enforceable if coerced, uninformed, or if the parties
lack the requisite capacity to enter into the contract.160  Yet, all three are at risk
in contemporary capitalism if the theory of methodological individualism is at
the heart of the system’s justification.  Individuals do not have a full, free
choice, and coercion is necessary to sustain a social order promoting the free
market.  As William Frederick has noted, power-aggrandizing is a naturally
occurring value cluster in plant, animal, and human life.161  One need not even
accept the conclusions of Critical Legal Studies to acknowledge that a legal
structure concerns the coercive enforcement of values.  The important point is
to avoid a Hayekian confusion between what is natural and what is
ideologically preferred.
The point of contention is not whether freedom and consent are good or
bad values.  Generally speaking, they are very good values.  The question,
rather, is whether freedom and consent mean anything outside the context of a
culture and nature.  If they do not, using them as if they do strains the
metaphor of nature to contract to the point where the metaphor can be
sustained only through coercion.
Individuals often are also uninformed about the decisions they make.  This
is, in part, an aspect of Williamson’s uncertainty principle.  In fact, individuals
account for the lack of information, lessening the risks associated with
uncertainty, but not removing uncertainty.  Structures exist in the market to
assist individuals to become informed and to participate in the market:
Participation in corporations is uniquely amenable to contracting because even the
ignorant have an army of helpers.  The stock market is one automatic helper.
Employees work at terms negotiated by unions (and nonunion employees can observe
the terms offered at other firms, which supply much information).162
                                                          
159. CHARLES TAYLOR, MULTICULTURALISM AND “THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION” 34-35
(1992).
160. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 14, at 22.
161. See FREDERICK, supra note 25, at 73-74.
162. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 14, at 24.
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As with freedom and consent, recognizing the degree of information available
is necessary for deciding when to bind individuals to promises.
Finally, there is the issue of capacity to make binding decisions.  Bounded
rationality suggests that there are limits to capacity.  Most individuals who
contract, however, do have the requisite ability to understand the terms of the
transaction proposed to them.  The embedded nature of the individual’s
decisionmaking must nevertheless be kept in mind.
C.  Summary of Agency Contractarianism
These critiques of the free market do not suggest that capitalism is an ill-
conceived system.  Instead, the point is that free-market theorists have
borrowed the authority of nature to justify a particular kind of capitalism, one
that is not merited by a fuller understanding of nature itself.  What agency
contractarianism lacks is a sufficiently developed normative model of the
relationships between the corporation and its stakeholders.  It also lacks a sense
of the “rules of the game.”  In other words, agency contractarianism lacks a
sense of social contractarianism.  A statement by Fischel and Easterbrook
demonstrates both the need to appeal to such broader notions of norms and the
reluctance to do so:
The normative thesis of the book is that corporate law should contain the terms
people would have negotiated, were the costs of negotiating at arm’s length for every
contingency sufficiently low . . . arguments about social contracts are problematic.
They are constructs rather than real contracts. . . .  Perhaps the corporate contract,
like the social contract, is no more than a rhetorical device.  After all, investors do not
sit down and haggle among themselves about the terms.  Investors buy stock in the
market and may know little more than its price.  The terms were established by
entrepreneurs, investment bankers, and managers.  Changes in the rules are
accomplished by voting rather than unanimous consent.  So why not view the
corporation as a republican government rather than a set of contracts?163
Indeed, why not apply social contract models of republican governments to a
theory of corporate governance?
IV
BUSINESS ETHICS AS SOCIAL CONTRACTING
This part of the article assesses an approach that is significantly advanced
over that of agency contractarianism—social contractarianism.  Social
contractarianism, however, is not without weaknesses.  Thus, Section A
provides a background of the social contractarian approach.  Section B focuses
specifically on the most advanced social contract application to business:
Donaldson and Dunfee’s Integrative Social Contracts Theory.  Section C
makes three critiques of this theory: an overly thin assessment of community,
an overly thin understanding of nature, and an overly thin understanding of
transcendence.
                                                          
163. Id. at 15-16.
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A. Background of the Social Contract Theory of Business Ethics
Thomas Donaldson is acknowledged as the pioneer of social contract theory
in business ethics.164  Donaldson argues that in our modern social contract,
corporations are given protections, such as limited liability and continuity of
life, in return for being efficient producers of goods and services and for not
abusing those who provide them with these rights, such as customers and
employees.165  Thus, “[w]hen Donaldson places the basic contract above
derivative duties, he sets the stage for a frontal assault on the conventional
wisdom of much of corporate America, that shareholder wealth maximization
is the great Good for business.”166
Michael Keeley applies social contract thinking to the structure of
organizations, arguing that corporations should operate according to principles
of equality, impartiality, and respect for individuals.167  Corporations ought to
be organized to allow individuals to achieve personal goals within the
organization rather than having collective goals imposed upon them.168  We will
return to Keeley, who, we think, offers some of the most powerful critiques of a
business-as-community approach of the kind we propose in Part V.
A second approach is that of extant social contracts.  The two leading
theorists of this approach are Thomas Dunfee and Steven Salbu.  Dunfee
argues that the actual legal contracts enacted by a particular community serve
as a basis for moral rules.169  Thus, a business should operate by consulting the
basic organizing principles of society to gain clarity on what social consensus
has been reached.
Salbu has applied this approach in a number of areas.170  One example is
insider trading regulation.171  Salbu argues that principles of procedural equality
and legitimate mechanisms of property acquisition require an expansive, rather
than fiduciary, approach to insider trading.172  In the extant social contracts
view, societies have agreed upon the rules of the game, and companies should
consult these principles rather than attempt to invent new principles of
normative behavior.
B.  The Basics of Integrative Social Contracts Theory
Donaldson and Dunfee have now joined these approaches to create a
theory called “Integrative Social Contracts Theory” (“ISCT”).  Donaldson and
                                                          
164. See, e.g., THOMAS DONALDSON, CORPORATIONS & MORALITY (1982).
165. See id. at 42-54.
166. Edward J. Conry, A Critique of Social Contracts for Business, 5 BUS. ETHICS Q. 187, 194
(1995).
167. See KEELEY, supra note 18, at 52-53.
168. See id.
169. See Thomas W. Dunfee, Business Ethics and Extant Social Contracts, 1 BUS. ETHICS Q. 23
(1991).
170. See Salbu, supra note 17.
171. See id.
172. See id.
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Dunfee combine the power of empirical studies of business behavior with a
normative evaluation of that behavior.  Thus, this approach purports to take
into account both the actual rules enacted by a community or society and a
normative understanding of those rules.
Donaldson and Dunfee’s argument is based on a normative, hypothetical,
macrosocial contract of political economy and on the extant social contracts
found in various commercial and noncommercial communities.173  Unlike the
family, economic organizations are not natural; they are “artifactual.”174
Because of human-bounded rationality and the artifactual nature of economic
life, ISCT requires moral free space with room for differentiated cultural and
religious norms that specify the particular rules for economic enterprise.175
Moral free space suggests that there are no universal norms.  Donaldson
and Dunfee address this moral relativism by proposing limits to the moral
norms a community can devise.  They provide a two-step analysis to provide
real moral support to a community’s norms.  First, an authentic norm is one to
which members of a community have consented in an informed way.176  Consent
must be real.177  To guarantee that, Donaldson and Dunfee argue that consent
must be reinforced by a right to exit the community.178  If a community has
enacted norms and those norms have been freely accepted, they are then
authentic.179
Relativism remains a threat: Individual communities could consent to
outrageous norms.  To counter this, Donaldson and Dunfee also test norms
according to their legitimacy.180  Drawing on Charles Taylor’s notion of
“hypergoods,” they introduce the idea of “hypernorms” that limit the range of
norms that can be adopted by a community.181 Donaldson and Dunfee do not
specify the content of these hypernorms, but they perceive a convergence of the
acceptance of norms from the world.182  By requiring compatibility with
hypernorms, Donaldson and Dunfee apply the philosophical model of social
contract so that any particular community norms must be in accord with formal
moral theory.  Thus, community norms are legitimate if they are authentic and
in accord with these hypernorms.183  At bottom, however, is consent: “the
justificatory linchpin of any social contract method, whether the proposed
contract is hypothetical or not.”184
                                                          
173. See Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 19, at 259-60.
174. Id. at 257.
175. See id. at 260-62.
176. See id. at 262.
177. See id. at 263.
178. See id. at 262-63.
179. See id. at 263.
180. See id. at 264-65.
181. Id. at 265.
182. See id. at 265-66.
183. See id.
184. Thomas W. Dunfee & Thomas Donaldson, Contractarian Business Ethics: Current Status and
Next Steps, 5 BUS. ETHICS Q. 173, 178-80 (1995).
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C. Three Critiques of Social Contracting
Before discussing the critiques of ISCT, it is important to note the advances
Donaldson and Dunfee have made over agency contractarianism.  By insisting
upon a social contract in which those citizens who bargain for corporate
existence—employees and customers—Donaldson and Dunfee show that
stakeholders are entitled to have corporations treat them in a nonabusive way.
It is not sufficient, as the agency contractarians allow, for a manager to focus on
shareholder profitability with no more than an ideological assumption that
doing so will reward other stakeholders.  Donaldson and Dunfee’s theory does
consider benefits to nonshareholder constituents, making corporations
accountable for all the consequences of their actions, not just those affecting a
particular group.
Donaldson and Dunfee’s two-step approach also has significant merit.
Human beings’ moral identity is shaped in communal relationships.  This
communitarian nature must be recognized; individual communities and
cultures must have the freedom to develop moral norms according to the
history of the organization and its historical interaction with the community in
which it is situated.  Relying only upon communities to identify moral norms,
however, is tantamount to endorsing moral relativism and tribalism.
Particularly in a global business environment, some global ethics are necessary
for the ongoing engagement of international business.  Thus, ISCT includes
several worthy ideas.
There are critiques, however, that question Donaldson and Dunfee’s
reliance on contractual methodology to achieve the results they desire.  Instead
of contracts, a richer notion of nature provides a more meaningful
identification of the community norms necessary for moral development—and
even the hypernorms necessary for restricting tribalism.  Such a notion of
nature, in fact, ultimately becomes a transcendent check on corporate activities.
1. An Overly Thin Communitarianism: Consent and Embeddedness.
Donaldson and Dunfee endorse the importance of community, but the view
they provide of community is very thin.  Sociologist Robert Nisbet, for
example, writes that human social needs have been met historically by small
organizations—mediating institutions.  These institutions include families,
guilds, local communities, and churches.185  In “such groups have been
engendered the primary types of identification: affection, friendship, prestige,
and recognition.”186
Mediating institutions stand between the individual and the large
superstructures of contemporary society.187  They provide a sense of community
                                                          
185. See ROBERT NISBET, THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY: A STUDY IN THE ETHICS OF ORDER
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in which individual responsibility and identity are developed.  That insight has
been applied notably, and most polemically politically, to institutions such as
family, church, neighborhood, and voluntary organizations, which stand
between the individual and the state.188  Because individuals develop their
identity in such institutions, members learn that they are not autonomous
beings but relational, social persons.  As relational beings, our “self” is
dependent upon our ethical duties.  In ways very similar to those noted by
Wilson regarding our attraction to family members and persons “like” us,189
persons become nurturing and affectionate toward others within the mediating
institution group.190  Such organizations, even business organizations, are
efficient at inculcating virtue when they view their institution as a family.191
a.  Banded contracts: an anthropological evolution.  Part II noted that
anthropologist Kent Flannery describes the differences between biological and
social evolution.192  He adds a further distinction between social evolution and
cultural evolution.  Cultural evolution is about the “shared beliefs, values,
cosmologies, ideologies, customs, and traditions that distinguish one group of
people from other groups, giving it its ethnic identity.”193  Social evolution
occurs at a different level of organizational complexity, such as “when a small
society  based on egalitarian relationships becomes a larger society based on
hierarchical relationships.”194  Culture gives rise to identity; society leads to
various forms of organization.  Society, like an organ, undergoes a different
kind of evolution than the species.  Culture, however, is akin to “what
biologists call divergent evolution—the rise of two or more new forms from a
common ancestor.”195
When societies are structured to require individuals to exist in associations
other than their natural small bands, an inherent instability results from the
coercive necessity of living together.196  The most basic unit of supra-familial
human organization throughout prehistory was the hunter-gatherer band.197
Such bands were generally comprised of twenty-five to thirty-five persons and
subsisted nomadically on wild plants and animals.198  Their structure, still
common into the nineteenth century, had
[n]o hereditary differences in rank or authority and their leadership was ephemeral,
based on differences in age, experience, skill, and charisma.  Divisions of labor were
                                                          
188. See id.
189. See WILSON, supra note 146, at 48-49.
190. Wilson acknowledges that there are also rivalries within the group, but those are different
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191. See TOM CHAPPELL, THE  SOUL OF A BUSINESS: MANAGING FOR PROFIT AND THE COMMON
GOOD 61-62 (1993).
192. See Flannery, supra note 79.
193. Id. at 3.
194. Id. at 4.
195. Id. at 3.
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197. See id. at 5.
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largely along the lines of age and gender, and most hunter-gathering bands had an
egalitarian ethic that downplayed any differences in prestige that arose.  This class of
society is important as a kind of baseline for future evolution: Fifteen thousand years
ago virtually all of our ancestors lived in such bands.199
The adoption of agriculture, however, led to autonomous village societies. 200
Such communities, according to Flannery, were larger than the bands, but
generally still displayed no hereditary differences in rank, and had no authority
over smaller villages nearby.201  In some places, a third level of society, rank
society, arose.202  In rank society, egalitarianism was replaced by an ideology in
which individuals were unequal at birth and leaders came from a hereditary
class.203  In such societies, small villages lost their autonomy to larger nearby
villages.204  In some cases, this loss of autonomy led to an even greater
amalgamation of villages under the authority of chiefdoms.205
The important question becomes how the band is transcended.  If done
coercively, evidence suggests that the larger group is unstable.
Once large villages begin to break down the autonomy of the small villages around
them, ambitious chiefs can bring very large territories and thousands of people under
their control.  Because of the superior size and manpower of chiefdoms, they can
usually overwhelm the autonomous village societies in their region.  This is often
done by raiding—a simple version of warfare—and may result in conversion of
defeated villagers into slaves.  Warfare among chiefdoms can be particularly nasty,
involving terror tactics such as torture, mutilation, ritual cannibalism, human sacrifice,
and the taking of trophy heads.206
On the other hand, if transcending bands occur for the benefit of the entire
community, then the new larger group may be more productive.  Yet, enlarging
the group may not be for the community’s collective benefit.  An archaic state
sometimes arose from competing chiefdoms,207 kingdoms with social strata
including nobles, merchants, and slaves.208  These states could be conquered and
grouped into multiethnic empires.209  The result was that “empires were the
largest and least stable.  Most broke down within two hundred years or less,
perhaps telling us something about the upper size limits of human social
organization.”210
It is difficult to not see similarities in the world of business.  An interesting
feature of the bands described above, moreover, is that they were founded on
an egalitarianism that seems to be the historical purpose of social contracting.
Decisions in bands place a premium on consensus, consent, and community.
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The contracts of these groups are not “bounded” but “banded.”  In short, it is
not just any community that fosters the desire to be ethical, but a small one—a
mediating institution.  In such a mediating institution, contracts are not based
on consent alone, but have a socialized content—a banded contract.
Gregory Johnson has explored the relationships between group sizes and
information processing and has shown that human beings are most efficient as
decisionmakers when the group which must reach consensus consists of, on
average, six individuals.211  Does this mean that business can be ethical only if
limited to groups of six individuals?  The answer, of course, is no.
Flannery’s chiefdoms and states are, in Johnson’s terminology,
“simultaneous hierarchies.”212  In a simultaneous hierarchy, all levels of the
hierarchy are present at any given time; in essence, “offices” or positions of
authority exist.  Johnson has noted, however, that there is another type of
hierarchy that may allow small groups to act communally without incurring the
stresses concomitant with any attempt to reach consensus in large groups.213 In
a sequential, as opposed to a simultaneous, hierarchy, a small group of
individuals reach a consensus first, and then one of them attempts to reach a
consensus with representatives of similarly sized groups.214  This sequential
hierarchy allows cooperative action by large groups of individuals who do not
grant differential status or power to any one member of their society.  This
sequential hierarchy, however, requires a popular desire or perceived need for
communal decisionmaking.215  Only in such a context do community, consent,
and consensus mean the same thing.  Even in large corporations, therefore,
relatively small communities could be created to provide the sense of moral
identity necessary for business ethics.  These bands—small communities within
a chiefdom or multinational corporation—are mediating institutions.
b.  Social contracting and mediating institutions.  According to Nisbet, the
Enlightenment social contract offered to guarantee freedom and equality in
exchange for loyalty to the state, rather than to mediating institutions.216  Legal
systems replaced private dispute resolution; taxation, regulation, and education
placed the state in the role of problem-solver.217  In each legal system, the state
guaranteed individuals the freedom to choose and to be treated impartially by
powerful mediating institutions.  Wilson goes so far as to characterize many of
the dominant ideologies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as founded
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on the replacement of the idea of commitment to a community with the idea of
choice.218
To Tocqueville, such a social contract, even in democratic form, was a
dangerous thought.  Protecting freedom and equality can throw a person “back
forever upon himself alone and threatens in the end to confine him entirely
within the solitude of his own heart.”219  When that happens, “the social tie is
destroyed, and each workman, standing alone, endeavors simply to gain the
most money at the least cost.  The will of the customer is then his only limit.”220
Tocqueville’s concern was that the moral and political quest for equality and
liberty could engender excessive selfishness and the rejection of any willingness
for individual sacrifice for a common good.  It could muzzle the communitarian
nature of humanity, thereby undermining the very social structures necessary to
develop individuals’ ability to make appropriate, rational decisions based on
consent.
In short, the political social contract has undermined the communities that
give rise to personal identity.  The same will be true in business unless a strong
mediating institution preserves communal identity.  By magnifying the needs of
stakeholders who are now free to voice needs and to participate in decisions,
the pursuit of individual needs assumes greater legitimacy because each person
has an equal right to pursue such.  This can be a beneficial correction to the
oppressive hierarchies that communities can foster, but the pursuit of
individual needs can also lead to the self-interested pursuit of economic greed
that often characterizes capitalism and to politics where voting for the common
good is subordinated to self-interest.  Thus, sewn in the quest for freedom and
equality were the philosophical and sociological seeds of self-interest
disconnected from social responsibility.  While freedom and consent may be
good values, they cannot be abstracted from the community that gave them
meaning.  The meaning of consent must be mediated by a certain kind of
community: a mediating institution.
2. An Overly Thin View of Nature: The Naturalistic Fallacy’s Fallacy.
Donaldson and Dunfee’s normative position is driven by a philosophical
commitment to traditional social contracting, but their commitment to
incorporating empirical findings raises the question whether human beings are
“hardwired” to behave ethically.  More accurately, human beings may be
hardwired to be social, and socialness requires the specification of the culture’s
ethical rules.  Yet, Donaldson and Dunfee’s commitment to another
philosophical principle—avoiding the naturalistic fallacy—prevents them from
relying on nature as a basis for morality.221
The historically demonstrated danger of the naturalist approach is that the
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theory becomes deterministic.  Sociobiology leaves little room for individual
initiative and creativity.  Business ethicist Bill Frederick, who relies upon
naturalist justifications to ground his approach, finds a way out of this,
however: One naturally recurring characteristic of human beings is our
technologizing ability.222  Technologizing does not mean only the creation of
gadgets, but, more broadly, that human beings have an evolutionary adaptation
to think symbolically and abstractly.223  Such thinking was first evidenced in
toolmaking, when human beings took raw materials and reconfigured them for
a new use.224  Human technologizing ability is also our ability to use language,
to think philosophically, to interpret the world theologically, and to create
cultures.225  Human beings can reconstruct and reformulate the world, and this
capacity for constant change prevents Frederick’s theory from becoming
deterministic.
Thus, one way to reformulate business ethics is to blend economizing—our
need for converting resources into productive energy—and ecologizing—our
physical need to live in an integrated, interconnected community—value
clusters.226  Human beings do this by technologizing.  Biological and
anthropological research may inform the study of business and its ethics.
Rather than attempting to explain moral values by biology, however, Frederick
uses empirical evidence only to bolster the legitimacy of extant social contracts
and of philosophical reflection on those contracts.  With such a well-
constructed platform, Frederick is probably reluctant to rely more completely
upon nature to ground business ethics for fear of committing the naturalistic
fallacy.
Yet, the difficulties with the naturalistic fallacy can, at least to some extent,
be overcome.  First, the naturalistic fallacy is overstated.  Every normative
theory commits the naturalistic fallacy, at least in part.  For example, in
defining hypernorms, Donaldson and Dunfee rely upon a cross-cultural
convergence of norms.  Thus, the identification of hypernorms depends upon
what norms already exist.  Donaldson and Dunfee attempt to abstract these
norms so that they do not immediately run afoul of the naturalistic fallacy.  In
fact, hypernorms are nevertheless derived from empirical evidence and,
therefore, suffer the same naturalistic fallacy as any theory deriving the
“ought” from what “is.”  This fallacy is actually a compelling feature of
Donaldson and Dunfee’s argument: If many cultures repeatedly articulate the
same norm, that norm is evidence of a “natural law” that all persons must take
into account in making moral judgments.  For example, the fact that all world
religions, as well as higher primates, have a social rule of reciprocity227 indicates
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that this norm may be stitched into our moral nature.
Similarly, social contractarians, including Donaldson and Dunfee, rely upon
a fictional, rational, negotiating group or thinker, producing social agreements
that are rational and are rationally articulated.  However, legal philosopher
Michael Perry argues that “[t]here is no noncircular way to justify [the claim
that one ought to be rational] because any putative justification would be
rational and thereby presuppose the authority of that which is at issue:
rationality.”228  There simply is no way to make our moral positions objective.
Whatever criteria we use to justify our moral norms cannot be noncircuitously
justified.  This problem is exactly the circular reasoning problem faced by the
naturalistic fallacy.  Thus, all moral thinking relies on the same theoretical
underpinnings as the naturalistic fallacy.
The second solution to the naturalistic fallacy is a sense of transcendence
that extends beyond human cognitive abilities: If business ethics do not take
into account the effects of corporate actions on nonshareholder constituents,
who will object?  Cannot society adopt any norm that is rationally chosen?
Why choose one set of norms over another?  In short, why worry about being
ethical in business?  The answer is notions of transcendence.
3. An Overly Thin View of Transcendence: Donaldson and Dunfee Meet
Yoda.  Donaldson and Dunfee are remarkably open to the influence of religion
in ethical practices.  They relate their approach to the compact with God in the
Torah and to the imaginary agreement among members of Plato’s state.229 This
openness to notions of transcendence, however, should be extended further.
What if ethical rules are not constituted simply by real or hypothetical
negotiations, but instead are the result of dealing with something larger?
This article will begin to sketch this possibility; it does not exhaust the
examples.  There are, however, four universal aspects of nature with which any
culture’s moral norms must deal.  Becoming aware of these aspects is itself an
important step in ethical reflection.  Yoda described achieving this awareness
as “experiencing the force.”230  More traditionally, ethical responsibilities are
learned through an experience with a transcendent reality, typically a religious
experience.  A Hindu finds his brahman-atman;231 Saul encountered Christ on
the road to Damascus.232  In each, and undoubtedly in many others as well,
ethical awareness comes from an experience with transcendence.
First, nature itself is a transcendent force.  The naturalistic fallacy is
troublesome in its “that’s the way things are, so there’s nothing we can do to
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change it” form.  It is equally troublesome to confuse what ought to be with
what is.  One naturalist complains that this is exactly the problem of the
political correctness movement; in its obsession with what ought to be done, it
does not take into account the realities of the way people act.233  As much as
some ethicists wish that human beings did not have economizing needs, the
world is competitive as well as cooperative.  In competition, there are losers.
Society may be structured to limit loss and pain, an idea that dovetails well with
ethical behavior, but it is impossible to remove reality—what nature is—from
human nature; some competitive battles are part of our nature.
a.  “If there is no God, then nothing is immoral.”  Another aspect of
transcendence is Dostoyevsky’s classic notion that without God, crime becomes
not only possible, but inevitable.234  However one defines the identity of God, it
is fundamentally a notion of an ultimate good to which human beings are
ultimately accountable.  For Dostoyevsky, told most famously in The Legend of
the Grand Inquisitor,235 religion is dangerous because it causes people to stop
thinking for themselves, preferring instead to defer their thinking to a leader.236
Individuals thus forfeit, to use Frederick’s term, their technologizing ability.
An equally problematic difficulty, however, is that an individually, or even
socially, constructed God can become the product of rationalization and
negotiation, ultimately producing rationalization of or agreement upon the
“legitimacy” of crime.
It is possible, of course, to dismiss the need for some ultimate good as
without grounding in reality.  Naturalistic evidence, however, demonstrates
that human beings have a natural reflective impulse grounded in our symbolic
nature.  Anthropologists trace evidence of human symbolic ability to roughly
40,000 years ago.237  At that time, not only art and language appeared, but also
religious ritual.238  Indeed, as Frederick argues, at least one of the characteristics
that differentiates human beings from nonhuman life is our religious, as well as
other symbolic, dimension.239  Thus, it may well be true not only that
Dostoyevsky was correct that the consequences of law—and ethics—without
religion are unacceptable, but also that the connection of spiritual realities and
ethics is rooted in human nature and culture.  In addition to the description of
various forces and clusters that recur throughout all human societies, a notion
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of transcendence of some kind is also necessary to ground any social ethic.  If
true, then there should be evidence of at least some common social ethic, of
various cultures repeating the same moral norms—evidence of a more deeply
rooted source, human nature, for the norm itself.
b.  Other transcendences: bands and reciprocity.  A third form of
transcendence is the evidence that human beings are most naturally at home in
band groups.  Bands require and depend upon characteristics of moral behavior
praised by many ethicists: equality, identity, altruism, and solidarity.  In
addition, the structure of the band, according to Johnson, best suits our
problem-solving abilities.240
The fact that virtually all of human history was lived in bands, and that band
moral values are still considered to be important, is evidence of the enduring,
cross-cultural legitimacy of those values.  They are, in short, communitarian
virtues.  Yet, it is not in the large megastructure of society where characteristics
such as equality, solidarity, altruism, and identity are formed, but in mediating
institutions.  More importantly, bands foster empathy.  Small bands are
required for moral development even in business organizations.
Moral empathy answers the question of why one should be moral.  Agency
and social contractarianism have trouble answering that question.  Finance
professor John Dobson’s term “technical universe”241 generally corresponds to
what we have called agency theory.  For Dobson, the theory’s failure to answer
the “why be moral” question reveals its intellectual incoherence:
[Technical universe] fails in terms of its own standards of logic and rationality; it
conjures a business milieu of opportunistic individuals pursuing wealth maximization
within a contractual nexus, yet it provides no mechanism within its construct for the
adequate (that is, economically efficient) enforcement of these contracts.  Without
such enforcement, the rationally determined economic goal of material advancement
is thwarted.  In short, a dominant epistemology of individualistic wealth maximization
ensures that individuals  within that universe never maximize wealth; it is a classic
“catch-22” scenario.  As Aristotle and others have pointed out, to really achieve what
is one’s self-interest, one cannot directly pursue what one perceives to be in one’s self-
interest; the Technical Universe lacks the philosophical sophistication to realize
this.242
Similarly, contemporary moral philosophy, of which ISCT is an example,
has difficulty answering the question: “ISCT, like business ethics theory in
general, suffers from all the internal inconsistencies and incoherence
characteristic of modernity.  Simply put, there is no such thing as a hypernorm.
Ethics is always contextual.”243
The final, universal characteristic of transcendence is the basic moral norm
of reciprocity.  In human society, some variation of the Golden Rule exists in
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nearly every culture.244  Yet differences among the formulations of the notion of
reciprocity are not without significance.  Doing to others what they have done
to you is quite different from doing to others as they would like you to do to
them, or from treating others as you would like to be treated.  Human societies
with a moral system, however, typically will include some form of the rule of
reciprocity.  Thus, reciprocity may be a moral principle with global appeal.
Reciprocity is a norm even shared by some of our closest primate relatives.
Frans de Waal has demonstrated that chimpanzees have sophisticated social
norms of reciprocity.245  The fact that our closest animal relatives have social
norms similar to our own should strengthen our commitment to our human
sense of morality.
These four examples of transcendent principles demonstrate that human
beings are, in fact, subject to forces beyond our control.  There are forces
within us that are part of our nature that must be considered when formulating
ethical rules for business.  Too often, hard-headed realists argue that business is
“survival of the fittest.”246  However, nature is more complex than that.  Nature
is the survival of the fit, not necessarily the fittest.  Nature is also about
individuals in small bands cooperating with one another, establishing bonds
that lead them to treat others altruistically, to practice solidarity and
reciprocity, and to inculcate moral identity.
The forces that transcend human control, whether Yoda’s force,
Dostoyevksy’s God, nature, or something else, are not simply the product of a
contract.  In a community of the right size, a banded contract reveals that our
nature is about more than consent.  These small mediating institutions are the
best means for restructuring the modern corporation.
V
CONCLUSION: BUSINESS AS MEDIATING INSTITUTION
Before beginning our sketch—and we emphasize that it is only a sketch—of
how businesses might be constructed as mediating institutions, there are two
important questions to be addressed.  Would we be better off not emphasizing
business’s attention to the human needs we have described?  In other words,
perhaps we should de-emphasize business’s role in personal fulfillment and
instead focus on providing more time for traditional structures such as family,
church, and neighborhood.  We prefer this alternative.  Our purpose in
suggesting that business become a mediating institution mainly points to the
reality of business’s contemporary preeminence, which may not permit a more
traditional allocation of personal time.  Moreover, we would suggest that given
the amount of time people do work, spending it in a system inattentive to
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human needs is problematic.  Thus, although we would prefer to see less
emphasis on business life as a place where personal identity is cultivated, we
are pessimistic that this will occur.
Second, given the size, power, and reach of megastructures in our world,
might any attempt to reconstruct multinational corporations be forced to make
so many compromises as to undermine the entire point of the exercise?  To this
we must concede that there is no current way of knowing whether a mediating
structure could be implemented, or if laws of corporate governance could be
changed to facilitate such an implementation.  The important point is the truth
of the assessment of human nature.  If we are right, then corporate law and
business structures should be changed.  If such change is impossible, then the
impossibility should stand as a judgment on the moral adequacy of existing laws
and structures.
It is clear that the current contractarian structure requires being “messed
up.”  Robert Jackall’s studies already demonstrate that large, bureaucratic
structures do precious little to foster ethical business behavior.247  Moreover, as
Dobson has argued, behind the pragmatic struggles to have corporations pay
attention to ethics is a critical intellectual incoherence of modernity itself.248
Regardless of what one thinks about business as a mediating institution and as
a pragmatic solution, it is an attempt to get to the heart of the ethical issues in
business.249
There are several analogies to business as a mediating institution.  Business
could be like a family,250 or compared to voluntary associations and
neighborhoods.251  To some extent, businesses do form moral behavior; because
they do, they provide opportunities to inculcate moral virtue if they create the
proper kind of mediating institutions.252  In addition to these views, businesses
can be mediating institutions from the perspective of this article’s naturalist
approach.  In particular, banded contracts provide a richer understanding of
and connection to moral virtue.  The contracts to which we bind ourselves are
those which connect us to moral empathy.
We specifically acknowledge that nature is ambiguous.  While it is naïve to
think we can escape certain hard-wired dimensions of our nature, it is also
dilettante to think that our nature does not provide us with the capacity to
culturally favor some kinds of behavior over others.  To fail to note both is to
fail to appreciate the dialectical dimension of human nature.  What then might
be problematic with a corporate model that is consciously holistic?
Social contractarian Michael Keeley provides many of the most persuasive
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arguments against what he calls an “organismic” model.253  His model relies
upon biological analogues, as well as a strand of anthropology, suggesting that
organizations take on their own life separate and apart from the combination of
the members of the organization.  As Keeley rightly notes, such a conception of
an organization can easily be used to de-emphasize the rights of individuals
within the organization to the extent that basic human rights are abridged.254
This possibility is why he argues, for instance, that James Madison insisted
upon a Bill of Rights appended to the U.S. Constitution.255  Keeley also notes
that although premodern societies did not have a modern notion of rights, there
were appropriate claims.256  In Hebrew society, these included rights to physical
security, to basic necessities, and to participation in community governance.257
Such checks are important, according to Keeley, because they provide for a
dispersal of power that safeguards participants from exploitation.258  Thus,
Keeley argues that institutions which challenge managerial authority may be
appropriate; these institutions may include unions and government.259
Keeley also argues that organizational models which provide members of
organizations with enhanced decisionmaking control over manufacturing
processes are not necessarily something to be admired.  He notes that German
Munitions Minister Albert Speer eschewed mechanistic organizational models
in favor of “collegial decision making, fluidity of organizational structures,
temporary organizational structures, and industrial self-responsibility [for local
managers.]”260  Speer’s approach proved productive and engendered
enthusiasm among his managers.261  Of course, the workers carrying out the
directives of the managers were conscripted slaves, and the munitions that were
produced went to the direct service of the goals of the Third Reich.  Thus,
Keeley argues that contemporary managerial mantras endorsing decentralized,
participatory workplaces ought not to be too quickly embraced.262  They are not
an ethical panacea.
Even more problematic are shallow contemporary attempts to foster a
notion of teamwork.  In their analysis of paper mills, Steven Vallas and John
Beck note that although firms reconstruct jobs in order to follow Total Quality
Management notions of team building and decentralization, which depend
upon worker involvement, the centralization of statistical analysis and the
centralized determination of job requirements outside of a team-driven process
simply discourage workers.263  Portraying such efforts as community building
                                                          
253. KEELEY, supra note 18, at 22.
254. Cf. KEELEY, supra note 18, at 129.
255. See id.
256. See id. at 60.
257. See id.
258. See id. at 154.
259. See id.
260. Id. at 6.
261. See id.
262. See id. at 6-9.
263. See Steven P. Vallas & John P. Beck, The Transformation of Work Revisited: The Limits of
FORT_FMT4.DOC 03/09/00  11:56 AM
Page 163: Summer 1999] BANDED CONTRACTS 205
can be justified only in a contractual manner, in which it is assumed that both
parties have freely consented to the new way of doing work.  It is clear that
efforts like those studied by Vallas and Beck have not even minimally
considered what makes a community.  As a result, to reject a business-as-
community approach because of the manipulation of communities through
sham quality efforts is similar to criticizing a small chamber orchestra because
the large symphony that replaced it does not sound like a chamber group.
Similarly, Richard Sennett has argued that managerial models of teamwork
destroy personal character because, at least in part, membership in any
particular business team is temporary.264  Learning to be a team player means
learning how to display certain traits of rhetoric and superficial
cooperativeness.  Such traits are masks appearing to demonstrate consensus.  In
reality, this apparent consensus is ordered acquiescence to centralized
management with little relationship between identifying one’s well-being and
the common good of the group.265  Moreover, Sennett found that peer pressure
within the groups to conform to a goal can be harsh, and the goal is typically
not what the group members view as important, but simply that of enhancing
the bottom line.266  This pressure effectively coerces individuals to work harder
under the guise of team-action, while simultaneously exempting upper-
management from responsibility for “cracking the whip.”267  Again, such efforts
have utterly no relationship to what constitutes a mediating institution, that is,
a small community where members of the mediating institution have a
relationship in the activities they undertake, not to the exclusion of outside
goals, but neither in complete deference to the interests of such outside
megastructures.
In this article, we are prepared to endorse the efforts of those attacking
bureaucratic structures, but we are not prepared to do so in the name of a
subsequent sole reliance on entrepreneurial initiative nor on a hegemonic
gimmick of teamwork.  Simply put, a choice between a centralized bureaucracy
dominating individuals and gimmicky teams doing senior management’s dirty
work is no choice.  We propose another kind of community in critiquing
contractual theories of the firm.
Nowhere in any of these critiques is there a discussion about the sizes of the
organizations in question.  They simply present a dichotomy between individual
protection and organizations.  In this article, we are speaking of a community
which is sufficiently attuned to human nature, and in which the goals of an
individual are largely synonymous with the goals of an organization.268
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Describing a notion of businesses as mediating institutions is a dialectical task
attending to both individual and organizational dynamics of corporate life.  It is
not one or the other, nor is it a false choice between domination and hegemony;
it is a fresh initiative.
In arguing for these small institutions, we do not advocate turning AT&T or
Ford Motor Company into contemporary hunter-gatherer bands of 150
individuals selling telecommunications equipment and automobiles.  Large,
multinational corporations are here to stay, and our proposal to emphasize
decentralization is one made to balance bureaucratic trends with human needs,
not to reject large organizations in their entirety.
The naturalist implications of business ethics begin from the premise that,
“[b]iologically, we are just another ape.  Mentally, we are a new phylum of
organisms.”269  It is the human symbolic ability to recreate, recombine, and
analyze that distinguishes us from our closest relatives in the animal kingdom.
Again, however, we are not romanticizing hunter-gatherer bands.  Our banded
inheritance, moreover, has risks as well as benefits.
One author has very liberally estimated that more than 100 million people have died
from war-related causes (including famine and disease) on our planet during this
century.  These deaths could be regarded as the price modern humanity has paid for
being divided into nation-states.  Yet this appalling figure is twenty times smaller than
the losses that might have resulted if the world’s population were still organized into
bands, tribes, and chiefdoms.270
The aim is not to glorify our banded past, but to note its reality and to integrate
its benefits into a contemporary business structure.  Corporations ought to be
structured to allow individuals to develop their moral identity within relatively
small groups, resolve their own disputes, and have representation in the
megastructures that inevitably will exist in our global, capitalistic world.  The
result, while similar to Donaldson and Dunfee’s social contract structure, will
successfully describe a more precise communitarian view of human nature.
A.  Small Numbers
Robert Jackall wrote one of the more bracing books about the ethics of
modern business.271  Essentially, he did field work in organizations and found
that virtue was socially constructed and removed from any kind of transcendent
benchmarks.272  The rules of behavior honored the king, the CEO,273 avoided
taking responsibility for mistakes,274 and exploited short-term advantages to
enhance reputation with persons leaving the job before the long-term results of
neglect appeared.275  Individuals were uninspired by notions of moral
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obligations; “[b]ureaucracy separates people from the consequences of their
actions.”276  The problem of bureaucracy is more familiar to business
management, but is not addressed well by the law.  This is seen in three
respects.
First, over the past twenty years, management has recognized that it is
inefficient to concentrate on bigness in the workplace.  Although their structure
can be abused, as we have seen, greater productivity results from decentralizing
work forces and teams.  In smaller groups, individuals take greater ownership
over the end product, produce higher-quality products and services—precisely
because they become psychologically invested in the community project—and
are more innovative.  The total quality movement, inspired by theorists such as
Deming277and Juran,278 followed this insight.  The movement stressed the
responsibility and creativity of individuals working in small groups called
quality circles.279  Similarly, a survey conducted by a Wall Street Journal
columnist in 1996, found that the leading management design tool was “self-
organization,” also known as cellular organization.280  Such firms stress
entrepreneurship, member ownership, and organization of the teams within the
firm.281  Management today has accepted the fact that individuals work well in
small groups.  A reason for this efficiency is the natural, human, cognitive
ability to be more comfortable in relatively small groups.
This is not to say, however, that it is always appropriate simply to graft this
model onto a complex, interpersonal organization such as a corporation.  A
May 1998 Wall Street Journal article reported that one of the most noted
socially responsible companies, Levi Strauss, created workplace havoc by
insisting upon teams.282  When managers reflected on the causes of this
problem, they concluded that the company culture simply was not ready for the
transformation.283  Despite the naturalness of small groups, corporations must
use the greatest care when transforming their workplace culture.  There must
likewise be caution in the methods chosen for instilling an authentic value of
teamwork.  Corporate exercises in fake para-military training designed to
create immediate, interpersonal dependencies under mock conditions of
warfare284 may or may not be successful in any given corporation.  The
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manipulation models noted by Vallas and Sennett are not the models we
advocate; nor are the models critiqued by Keeley.  However, because of the
abuses made of the teams, they both must exist and should exist only within a
structure that can constrain unsavory dimensions.  We simply advocate a better
balance than what currently exists.  There is no magic elixir for corporate
morality and governance, but a model that matches our natural characteristics
when carefully considering the extant corporate culture is more likely to be
successful.
Second, legal scholars have recognized that changing patterns of global
business may require changes in the theory of contract law.  Steven Salbu has
argued that the transactional notion of contracts worked well in the relatively
stable economies of the Middle Ages, but such notions are poorly suited to a
fast-paced global economy with great uncertainty.285  In an unpredictable
environment, management must operate not by specifying obligations and
being adversarial, but by addressing uncertainty through cooperation.286  Salbu
thus stresses the development of relational contracting, with parties attempting
to find win-win situations rather than win-loss alternatives.287  Interestingly, the
model Salbu offers is the “functional family”:
Like the family members who genuinely wish one another success, transactional allies
will naturally constrain self-interest through concessions made for the ultimate good
of others and of the alliance.  Those who interact functionally and familially have
little use for formalization of obligation, and indeed such formalization would be
wasteful and ineffective. . . .  Innovations in relationship management forms may
better serve emerging, non-adversarial forms of cooperative linkages.288
Thus, contract doctrine must recognize forms of human interaction other than
the adversarial, opportunistic model offered by agency contracting.289
Third, corporate governance theory must consider anthropological sources.
Megastructures carry with them coercion and conflict.  Flannery notes, for
example, that in the late 1770s, four of the Hawaiian Islands—Hawaii, Maui,
Oahu, and Kauai—had native chiefs ruling over a chiefdom.290 The competition
among them, particularly that of Oahu and Maui for the smaller islands of
Lanai and Molokai, produced a period of intrigue, warfare, and usurpation that
ultimately allowed Kamehameha to conquer all the islands under the power of
a single state.291  Hawaii, of course, is hardly a unique example.  The
amalgamation of bands into larger organizations requires coercion in direct
confrontation with social harmony and virtue.  With multinational corporations
sometimes equal in size, and often in wealth, to some nation-states, advice to
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political organizations is equally applicable to business:
If we are to recover social harmony and virtue, if we are to build back into society the
virtues that made it work for us, it is vital that we reduce the power and scope of the
state.  That does not mean a vicious war of all against all.  It means devolution:
devolution of power over people’s lives to parishes, computer networks, clubs, teams,
self-help groups, small businesses—everything small and local.292
There is, therefore, a need to restructure workplaces into communities of
relatively small groups that can foster a sense of moral virtue and identity.  In
these places, individuals can acquire a self-interest that is more than
opportunistic behavior and is connected to the common good.  A central virtue
for business is equality, a key virtue in any social contract.  “In hunter-gatherer
societies, nobody must be allowed to become big-headed.”293  In the face of
individualistic entropy, the maintenance of egalitarian norms is crucial to band
selection.294  Norms of equality, solidarity, and altruism will not be found in big
bureaucratic institutions, but in small groups in which individuals in bands
negotiate the relational rules that create win-win rather than win-lose contracts.
B.  Dispute Resolution
As noted in Part III, one of the central ways in which nation-states, using
Enlightenment social contract theories, undermined prior institutions was by
settling disputes.295  Dispute settlement occurred in English legal history, not
only in the development of the common law, in which juries gradually were
formalized into formal adjudicating mechanisms rather than simple communal
peer decisionmaking,296 but also when royal justice replaced local justice.297
There is a risk, however, in relying upon outside sources for resolving
disputes.  External power literally foreign to the small community can
undermine the communal dynamic.  In some nonfunctional situations, such as a
family engaged in child abuse, outside power is necessary.  However, if too
readily available, outside intervention can also rend the fabric of a functional
community.
Anthropologist Gregory Johnson argues that decisionmaking becomes
progressively less efficient in groups of more than six.298  This number is far
smaller than even the very small size of bands, usually twenty-five to thirty-five
individuals.  Yet, as Johnson notes, bands also rely on face-to-face consensus.299
Creating relatively small, autonomous groups thus facilitates dispute resolution
without turning to outside dispute resolvers, such as the courts, which might
undermine the community itself.
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Johnson’s research displays the possibility that societies and groups larger
than band-size may continue to make decisions effectively based on consensus.
Although his research focused on the organization of pre-historic groups,
Johnson’s conclusions are fundamental to any understanding of human social
organization; his findings are as applicable to contemporary as to ancient
populations, and provide insight into alternative, nonhierarchical organizations
for large groups. One of the most interesting and relevant conclusions of his
research is that it is possible to maintain face-to-face interaction and consensus-
based decisionmaking within relatively large social units through sequential
hierarchies.300  Small groups each provide a representative to a meeting of the
representatives of several small groups. The individual need not be elected,
granted any special rights or privileges, or invested with any authority other
than to speak for his or her group.  Similar meetings occur “up the line,” until
the result is a final decision based on consensus—a decision that has
incorporated the positions of many individuals, but that never required the
simultaneous consensus of all.
A major strength of Johnson’s work is that it is supported by other lines of
research.  Many anthropologists and other researchers have noted very
consistent group sizes among aboriginal populations, around twenty-five to
thirty-five persons in a band and around 450 to 600 in a “macroband,” the
largest population which regularly interacts.301  These average numbers, given
the vast array of environmental and social variables found throughout the
world, are surprisingly consistent.  A powerful explanation for this consistency
is Johnson’s research on group consensus: A band is a number of  nuclear
families interacting effectively, without forming too large a group.  With the aid
of various integrative institutions, such as rituals and the formation of task
groups with specific responsibilities, the use of sequential hierarchies allows
multiple bands to coexist and function cohesively at the level of the
macroband.302
That human macroband populations include around 500 individuals is most
likely the result of effective compromise between the stresses of scale and the
needs of human populations for diversity and numbers sufficient to ensure
autonomous success.  Martin Wobst has pioneered the investigation of cultural
effects on population sizes, and its concomitant effects and implications for
population success.303  Wobst has determined that a group must contain
approximately 500 individuals to ensure that each generation of adults may find
partners, enabling the population to survive.  That number coincides with what
Birdsell—and the many researchers who have followed his lead—has observed
for macroband populations in Australia, and which he correlated with linguistic
                                                          
300. See supra notes 217-218 and accompanying text.
301. For an early but thorough examination of this issue, see Birdsell, supra note 148, at 196-99.
302. For a brief but thorough discussion, see LEE, supra note 46 (both references); Johnson,
Organizational Structure, supra note 211, at 405-06.
303. See Wobst, supra note 47.
FORT_FMT4.DOC 03/09/00  11:56 AM
Page 163: Summer 1999] BANDED CONTRACTS 211
boundaries.304  Thus, functional populations of hunter-gatherers of 500
individuals are well documented, and even though they employ consensual
decisionmaking, sequential hierarchies allow this to work successfully for many
groups.  We only suggest these notions to provoke thought.  Clearly, a more
extensive elaboration of how these structures might be implemented in
business organizations requires much more extensive attention.  The important
point, however, is that naturalistic categories demonstrate transcendent
realities of human life.  Anthropological research provides categories that
account for these communal realities while avoiding the abuses teams and the
like have suffered.  The difference is between a “team” and a mediating
institution.
Anthropology, therefore, helps explain how human societies can construct
themselves, even in large megastructures, while preserving community identity
within small mediating institutions.  This insight is important for designing not
only structures to minimize disputes and foster communal identity, but also
corporate governance structures.
C.  Federated Corporate Governance
It is unrealistic for corporations to devolve into small bands of workers.  We
live in an age of global, multinational corporations with thousands of workers
in dozens of countries.  Yet, efficiency, productivity, and creativity are
enhanced when individuals are placed in small, problem-solving mediating
institutions.305  It is now important for scholars of corporate governance to
recognize that these small units are successful for anthropological reasons and
have moral significance.
Agency contractarianism, relying on contracts bargained between
autonomous negotiators, cannot explain the success of small groups.  Instead,
the theory of banded contracts, in which contracts themselves have a different
nature because of the agreement’s social context and the communal identity of
individuals forming the contracts, provides a better analysis.  A communal
sense does not result from a community of any size, however, as Donaldson and
Dunfee’s theory seems to assume, but only from a community of relatively
small numbers.
As in Integrative Social Contracts Theory, the notion of business-as-
mediating-institution recognizes the importance of community contracts and
overarching norms to control the tribal excesses that small communities could
indulge.  The notion of a community in business-as-mediating-institution
theory, however, has specified requirements to accord with human nature:
small numbers, internal group dispute resolution, and individual participation.
Beyond these community norms, cross-cultural norms must also be
identified.  One such norm might be a notion of reciprocity, the content of
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which will vary according to the level of selection.  Within a mediating
institution, reciprocity may mean treating others as the actor would like to be
treated.  Among institutions or among the individual representatives of
institutions in a sequential hierarchy, reciprocity might be “generous tit-for-
tat,”306 reflecting the actions of the other party with occasional forgiveness for
negative outcomes to prevent a degenerative cycle of retribution and revenge.
Undoubtedly, there are other cross-cultural norms, such as participation in
group decisionmaking,307 which suggest a greater role for employees on boards
of directors.308  In every norm, the ongoing tension between the recurring
limitations of human nature and the human symbolic technologizing ability to
recombine and recreate to find new structures of organization will persist.
Moreover, despite our concerns regarding the methodology Donaldson and
Dunfee use to develop Integrative Social Contracts Theory and the resulting
categories that accompany this methodology, we believe that the approach we
describe is at least complementary to, if not largely consistent with, the
“Marketplace of Morality” argument made in this special issue by Thomas
Dunfee.309  We agree with Dunfee that a monotonist view of corporate
responsibility is too narrow because stakeholders, to whom a corporation must
pay attention, have interests beyond that of shareholder wealth maximization.
This is true for the complex anthropological reasons we have developed in this
article.  More importantly, Dunfee lists four guiding principles for corporate
managers:
(1)  There is a presumption that all corporate actions must be undertaken to
maximize shareholder wealth;
(2)  Managers must respond to and anticipate existing and changing marketplace
morality relevant to the firm that may have a negative impact on shareholder 
wealth;
(3)  The presumption in Principle One may be rebutted where clear and convincing
evidence exists that marketplace morality relevant to the firm would justify a
decision that cannot be shown to maximize shareholder wealth directly; and
(4)  Managers must act consistently with hypernorms (manifest universal norms and
principles).310
Having already indicated our attraction to and concerns with hypernorms,
we simply wish to indicate that Dunfee’s first three principles may be best
implemented by a structure that provides significant autonomy to the groups
within the corporation, whose sizes are such that they match up with human
cognitive capacities to process a limited number of relationships.  Such groups
should have a primary voice in determining the actions of managers of the
corporation.
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One article could not describe all of the dimensions of viewing businesses as
mediating institutions and the impact of such a view on corporate governance.
Instead, the purpose of this article has been narrow, but important: Scholars
should be careful when using nature and evolution to justify socioeconomic
structures, but there is also a reward in doing so.
In particular, contrary to the use often made of evolution and nature,
anthropological research indicates that human beings are most adapted to
living and working in the small organizations where their cultural and moral
identities are formed.  Human beings should not be viewed simply and only as
autonomous contractors as agency contractarians do.  It risks undermining
moral identity to force communal human beings into bureaucratic structures.
Social contracting theory also must be supplemented by a much more
explicit understanding of the communal nature of human beings.  That
understanding is best gained by learning from those who specifically study
human nature.  The small mediating institutions necessary to nurture our
natural communal identity require specific forms of corporate structure before
the social contract theory can begin to analyze the authenticity of norms
provided by other communities and to draw upon norms from around the
world.  Moreover, without a sense that not everything can be negotiated and
without a sense of a transcendence, social contracting provides little
justification for being ethical.  Thus, an important first step is to recognize the
interconnected identity of human beings with each other and with nature as a
whole.  Such an experience may not replicate Yoda, but it will change the way
we look at business.  The second step is to recognize the importance of size.
While “size matters not” in the access to transcendent power, it does matter to
human moral identity for very transcendent, natural reasons.
